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The "Safe Schools" Provision: Can a




At first glance, one might wonder why the "Safe Schools" Provision
of the California Constitution, article I, section 28(c), would generate any
controversy at all. It provides:
RIGHT TO SAFE SCHOOLS. All students and staff of public pri-
mary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the in-
alienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and
peaceful.'
Certainly this new right, added to the constitution when Proposition
8 was approved by the electorate in 1982,2 is something that all of us can
support. After all, every reasonable person wants safe schools. Every
reasonable person wants young people to be able to attend campuses that
are free from crime, violence, and drug abuse. Every reasonable person
agrees that safer schools will lead to better education and a higher quality
of life for all people.
Yet, despite this apparent agreement, the new constitutional provi-
sion has triggered an increasingly volatile legal battle, fueled by propo-
nents of Proposition 8 who are arguing in both the media and the courts
for additional school district duties and increased liability for injuries on
* Mr. Biegel, a member of the California Bar, is currently a Lecturer in Education Law,
Curricular Policy, and Directed Field Studies at the UCLA Graduate School of Education,
and an administrator in charge of the university's teacher training program at junior and se-
nior high schools in the Los Angeles area. A former classroom teacher specializing in gifted
education, he has also directed summer job programs for economically disadvantaged youth.
The author would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance and support of Professor
Michael R. Asimow (UCLA School of Law), California Attorneys Elena B. Bazes and Eric D.
Berkowitz, and Professor Marilyn Kourilsky (UCLA Graduate School of Education).
1. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(c).
2. Known from the beginning as the "Victims' Bill of Rights," this highly publicized
initiative was designed to effect changes in the rights of victims and the laws relating to truth-
in-evidence, bail, and the use of prior convictions in criminal proceedings. See generally CAL.
CoNsT. art. I, § 28.
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school grounds.3 The public schools, already beset with a multitude of
complicated and wide-ranging problems,4 are now faced with the impli-
cations of the recent trial court decision in Hosemann v. Oakland Unified
School District.5
Stephen Hosemann was physically assaulted on his junior high cam-
pus by a former schoolmate.6 Fearing further attacks, he brought an
action against both the Oakland Unified School District and his assailant,
Edward Hardy, seeking declaratory relief under article I, section 28(c).'
Judge Richard Bartalini, in a sweeping and unusual thirty-eight page de-
cision that is by far the most aggressive position taken to date by the
California courts, declared that the Safe Schools Provision not only pro-
vides injured plaintiffs with a new cause of action, but mandates an af-
firmative duty "to make schools safe," no matter what the cost.' Since
Hosemann brings into focus the controversy over the correct interpreta-
tion of subdivision (c), the media quickly proclaimed it a landmark case,
one that could go to the Supreme Court for a final determination.'
Although statistics abound, no one seems to know just how safe or
unsafe the public schools are.'0 Opinions on the subject, however, are
not lacking. Attorney Lois DeJulio, for example, who represented the
defendant in the landmark school search and seizure case of New Jersey
v. T.L. 0., " emphasized that "schools are not the blackboard jungle they
3. See generally Oakland Schools Get the Word: Fight Campus Crime, L.A. Times, Dec.
8, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 3: "At least 30 similar lawsuits, all based on ... the Victims' Bill of
Rights' initiative, are pending throughout the state." (emphasis added).
See also Court Orders Safe Schools, 72 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1986, at 30 [hereinafter Safe
Schools]; Nicholson, Rapp & Carrington, Campus Safety: A Legal Imperative, 33 Educ. L.
Rep. (West) 981 (1986); Thompson, Officials Held Liable for Crime in the Schools, L.A. Daily
Journal, May 23, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
4. See infra notes 253-270 and accompanying text.
5. No. 583092-9 (Alameda County Super. Ct., May 12, 1986), appeal pending, No.
A035856 (1st Dist. Cal. Ct. App.) [hereinafter Hosemann].
6. The trial court said only that "Hosemann was trapped and physically assaulted by
Hardy." Id. at 5. No evidence of any injuries was presented.
7. At the time of the assault, in June 1983, Hardy attended another school in the Oak-
land district. There has apparently been no direct personal contact between the two young
men since then. Id. at 5-6.
8. Id. at 28-29, 36.
9. See L.A. Times, May 13, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 4; see also Thompson, supra note 3; Safe
Schools, supra note 3.
10. Education Digest reported in April 1986 that "[i]n fact, statistics on school disorder
are too vague and disorderly to yield precise information." Brooks, Are We Evading the Issue
of Disorder in the Schools?, EDuc. DIG., April 1986, at 10. The L.A. Times reported in June
1986 that "there is still little agreement among experts nationwide over whether school vio-
lence is worsening in America." Detroit Officials Grapple with Increase in School Shootings,
L.A. Times, June 6, 1986, § 1, at 16, col. 4.
11. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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have been painted to be."12 Judge George Nicholson,13 though, who co-
authored Proposition 8 along with Paul Gann,"g declared in 1986 that
"statistics ... are inadequate to convey the magnitude of school safety
problems in America."15
Perhaps the only consensus on this issue is that there are schools
with serious problems in this regard, 16 and that more can be done to
make the situation better. Some people would argue that the Safe
Schools Provision is the key to solving these problems.17
This Article focuses on the possible implications of article I, section
28(c) in light of recent developments. Part I examines the various theo-
ries of recovery currently available for injuries on school grounds. 8 Part
12. Stewart, In the Supreme Court, 71 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 51, 54.
13. Judge Nicholson, a recent appointee to the municipal court bench in Sacramento, is a
former Senior Assistant Attorney General and was the first director of the National School
Safety Center. He has been a tireless proponent of expanded school district duties and liabili-
ties under article I, section 28(c). See, eg., Nicholson & Carrington, The Victims' Movement:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1 (1984).
14. Mr. Gann is well known in California for his involvement in a series of controversial
ballot initiatives, including Proposition 13 (1978), Proposition 4 (1979), Proposition 8 (1982),
Proposition 24 (1984), and Proposition 61 (1986). See generally Promises, Promises: Are Jarvis
and Gann as Good as Their Words?, L.A. Daily Journal, June 27, 1986, § 1, at 4, col. 3.
15. Hanelt, Nicholson & Washburn, Of Inalienable Rights and Exclusive Remedies, 30
Educ. L. Rep. (West) 19 (1986). The recent annual report of crimes in the Los Angeles Uni-
fied School District is indicative of the contradictory information available on the subject.
Although "[r]eports of crimes involving students rose 29% ...in 1985-86," the district
claimed that this figure "was largely the result of an abnormally high level of child-abuse
reporting... prompted by the publicity surrounding... recent cases..." Reported Crimes at
Schools Show Rise and Enigma, L.A. Times, October 23, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
The 1985-86 statistics offered similar contradictory information on the drug abuse prob-
lem. Reports of drug possession or sale dropped 12% over the same period, yet
"[i]nvestigations by district police indicate that some drug-related activity may have merely
shifted from school grounds to off-campus areas." It was further emphasized that these statis-
tics merely reflected reported crimes; no follow-up information was available regarding
whether, or to what extent, these reports had been substantiated. Id. at 5, col. 1.
Although two major reports on school safety have been released during the 1980's (Disor-
der in Our Schools, the 1984 Bauer Report for the Reagan Administration, and the Report of
the Commission on Safe Schools of the American Federation of Teachers, 1985), the "last com-
prehensive, nationwide study of school crime, in all its complex aspects," was published in
1978 (Violent Schools-Safe Schools, the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare Report).
See Hanelt, Nicholson & Washburn, supra, at 20.
16. See L.A. Times, supra note 10, at 16, col. 4 ("It seems clear that the increased ease
with which guns are becoming available to teen-agers has worsened the climate of fear in many
inner city schools."); see also Honig & Van de Kamp, Letter of Introduction, 11 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. (1984) ("[Flar too many crime victims are public school students and staff.").
17. See generally Sawyer, The Right to Safe Schools: A Newly Recognized Inalienable
Right, 14 PAC. L.J. 1309 (1983) (an excellent overview of article I, § 28(c) by Ms. Kimberly
Sawyer, and an enthusiastic presentation of the case for an affirmative duty to make schools
safe); see also Hanelt, Nicholson & Washburn, supra note 15.
18. See infra notes 21-46 and accompanying text.
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II explores five possible interpretations of the Safe Schools Provision. 9
Part III discusses the practical impact of additional duties and increased
liability under the Safe Schools Provision.20 The Article concludes that
this provision should be narrowly interpreted to avoid imposing obliga-
tions on the schools that are inconsistent with current law, violative of
public policy, and likely to create even more problems on a practical level
for both teachers and administrators.
I. Theories of Recovery for Injuries on School Grounds
Currently, people injured on school grounds can benefit from a large
body of case law in the negligence area, statutory obligations in the Cali-
fornia Education Code,21 the scheme of statutory liability under the Cali-
fornia Government Code,22 and the courts' application of various
doctrines in both the federal and state constitutions.
When students are injured by fellow students,23 school districts can
19. See infra notes 47-274 and accompanying text. These five interpretations are set forth
as follows: (a) The provision is simply a restatement of existing law, because what it says is
neither new nor different. See infra notes 52-99 and accompanying text. (b) The provision is
not self-executing, and therefore represents an invitation to the legislature to come up with a
stautory scheme for implementing the provision. See infra notes 100-129 and accompanying
text. (c) The provision maximizes school safety by making it easier to prosecute those who
commit crimes on school grounds. See infra notes 130-149 and accompanying text. (d) The
provision provides for additional duties and/or remedies under existing tort law doctrines. See
infra notes 150-205 and accompanying text. (e) The provision mandates an affirmative duty to
make schools safe regardless of cost. See infra notes 206-274 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 275-290 and accompanying text.
21. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44807 (West 1978).
See generally CAL. EDUC. CODE ch. 4, art. 1, §§ 44000-48424 (Rights and Duties of Cer-
tificated Employees); ch. 6, art. 1, §§ 48900-48925 (Pupil Rights and Responsibilities, Suspen-
sion or Expulsion); ch. 6, art. 5, §§ 49000-49001 (Pupil Rights and Responsibilities,
Prohibition of Corporal Punishment) (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
22. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 800-895.8 (West 1980) (liabilities and immunities
under the Tort Claims Act).
23. This analysis focuses on student injuries because the great majority of legal disputes in
this area (including the key cases of Hosemann, supra note 5, Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified
School District, 186 Cal. App. 3d 707, 230 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1986) (hereinafter Rodriquez II),
and Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205
Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984)) involve such injuries. However, since article I, section 28(c) also refers
to the rights of public school staff, it must be noted that teachers have their own rights and
remedies under negligence law as well. See 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAv
§ 69 (8th ed. 1973): "In addition to being responsible for [a] known dangerous condition, a
school district is liable for injuries to person or property resulting from negligence of officers or
employees acting within the scope of their employment." (emphasis added). But see Halliman
v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 163 Cal. App. 3d 46, 209 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1984) (for




generally be found liable not only for their own actions,24 but for the
actions of their administrators and teachers, under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior.25 Negligent actions that give rise to liability tend to
fall into one of two categories: (1) failing to exercise proper supervi-
sion, 26 and (2) directing or permitting pupils to engage in conduct which
might reasonably be foreseen to result in injuries to others.27
Although the courts usually find districts liable for injuries that oc-
cur during school hours and are caused by students enrolled in the par-
ticular school, they are less likely to find liability where the perpetrator is
not a student and the injury takes place before or after school.28
Courts decide cases in this area on practical grounds, determining
whether or not a school could reasonably be expected to prevent the par-
ticular injury under all the circumstances of the case.29 Three basic prin-
ciples are often determinative: (1) school districts are not insurers of
pupil safety; 30 (2) school personnel cannot supervise all movements and
24. If it can be shown, for example, that a school district policy decision is the actual and
proximate cause of an injury on school grounds, the district may be held liable for negligence.
A relatively new cause of action, negligent hiring, arguably qualifies as a "school district ac-
tion" in this regard, although Professor Richard Epstein states that "it may be limited because
other forms of liability such as vicarious liability will be available anyway." See M. Silver,
Negligent Hiring Claims Take Off, 73 A.B.A. J., May, 1987, at 72.
25. See generally Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 III. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1959). See also K. ALEXANDER & M. ALEXANDER, AMERI-
CAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 484 (2d ed. 1985); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (5th ed. 1984).
26. See, eg., Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d. 741, 747, 470 P.2d
360, 363, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1970).
27. Id. at 748-49, 470 P.2d at 364, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 380. See also Beck v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 225 Cal. App. 2d 503, 37 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1964), Ziegler v. Santa Cruz
City High School Dist., 168 Cal. App. 2d 277, 283, 335 P.2d 709, 712 (1959).
28. See generally Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula School Dist., 83 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147
Cal. Rptr. 898 (1978) (district not liable for injuries occurring while playing a game, at approx-
imately 5:30 p.m., after gaining access to playground "through an unlocked gate or a hole in
the fence"); Rodriguez II, 186 Cal. App. 3d 707, 230 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1986) (district not liable
for injuries caused by non-student assailant on school grounds). But see Peterson v. San Fran-
cisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984)
(district held liable for injuries caused during school hours, but by unidentified assailant who
was arguably a non-student).
29. See Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978); Perna v. Conejo Valley Unified School Dist., 143 Cal. App. 3d 292, 192
Cal. Rptr. 10 (1983).
30. Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist., 199 Cal. Rptr. 524, 528 (1984) (official
opinion ordered depublished by California Supreme Court and case retransferred with instruc-
tions to reconsider (see infra notes 159-162 and accompanying text)) [hereinafter Rodriguez 1]
("We find no precedent to require the School District to be guarantors of protection from all
harm."); Bartell, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 498, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 901 ("School districts and their
employees have never been considered insurers of the physical safety of their students.").
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activities of pupils;31 and (3) schools are expected to take only such pre-
ventive action as is practically available to them.32
California schools are faced with additional legal obligations regard-
ing school safety under Education Code section 44807, which imposes a
statutory duty to supervise. Teachers are expected to "hold pupils to a
strict account for their conduct,"33 and both teachers and administrators
are allowed to exercise "physical control" over students to the extent
that it is "reasonably necessary to maintain order, protect property, or
protect the health and safety of pupils, or to maintain proper and appro-
priate conditions conducive to learning." '34
Government tort immunity no longer bars injured plaintiffs. If stat-
utory liability can be established under the provisions of the California
Government Code,35 a successful cause of action can often be main-
tained.36 Since all government tort liability must be based on statute,37
an aggrieved party needs to show that the school district acted in viola-
tion of at least one statute "designed to protect against the risk of...
31. See generally Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 31
Cal. Rptr. 847, 850-51 (1963); Reithardt v. Board of Educ., 43 Cal. App. 2d 629, 111 P.2d 440
(1941).
32. See Peterson, 36 Cal. 3d at 805-06, 814, 685 P.2d at 1195-96, 1202, 205 Cal. Rptr. at
844-45, 851; see also Rodriguez I, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 528, 529. See generally Annotation, Tort
Liability of Public Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning for Injuri's Caused by Acts of
Fellow Students, 36 A.L.R. 3d 330 (1971).
The expanded scope of the special relationship doctrine today arguably provides an in-
jured plaintiff with a more effective vehicle for establishing that defendant school district had a
duty to act. See infra notes 150-190 and accompanying text.
33. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44807 (West 1978).
34. Id. (emphasis added). The California Supreme Court has indicated that this section
codifies the traditional common law doctrine of in locoparentis, under which school employees
have been allowed greater latitude in their actions because they stand "in the place of the
parent." In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d 550, 560, 571, 709 P.2d 1287, 1292-93, 1300-01, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 118, 124, 131 (1985). Opinions differ, though, as to the extent of this "greater latitude."
The U.S. Supreme Court recently declared that school officials could no longer claim "paren-
tal" immunity from the Fourth Amendment based on this doctrine. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 336 (1985). The California Supreme Court has asserted that "[a]n overemphasis of
this doctrine ignores the realities of modern public school education." In re William G., 40
Cal. 3d at 560, 709 P.2d at 1292-93, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24. Justice Mosk, however, cites
this code section as proof that the basic doctrine of in loco parentis is not dead in California,
and argues that the right of school officials to search pupils is implicit in the statutory directive
of section 44807. Id. at 571-72, 709 P.2d at 1300-01, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
35. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810-895.8 (West 1980).
36. See Rodriguez II, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (describing the
"logical sequence of analysis of government tort cases"). See also Lopez v. Southern California
Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 792, 710 P.2d 907, 914, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840, 847 (1985)
("[Tihe rule is liability; immunity is the exception").
37. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1980). See also Lopez, 40 Cal. 3d at 785 n.2, 709 P.2d
at 909 n.2, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.2.
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[that]... particular kind of injury .... ,"3 8
Serrano v. Priest 39 provides yet another legal doctrine to use against
the schools in a safety context. Since the court ruled there that education
in California is a fundamental right under the state's own Equal Protec-
tion Clause,' a plaintiff could reasonably assert that students' fundamen-
tal rights are being violated when education at a particular school is
adversely affected by criminal acts on campus.4 1
Finally, recent decisions on fourth amendment rights are filled with
strong, unequivocal language regarding the duties and obligations of
schools. The California Supreme Court in In re William G.42 empha-
sized that "the school premises must be safe and welcoming," and that
"society assumes a duty to protect [students] from dangers posed by anti-
social activities."'43 Justice Powell, in TL. O.,4 was even more forceful:
Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teach-
ers cannot begin to educate their students. And apart from educa-
tion, the school has the obligation to protect pupils from
mistreatment by other children, and also to protect teachers them-
selves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent
38. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980). See also Tirpak v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist., 187 Cal. App. 3d 639, 232 Cal. Rptr 61 (1986).
For this purpose, the word "statute" has been loosely interpreted to include any enact-
ment. See Rodriguez II, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 833 ("Section 815.6...
makes a public entity liable for its failure to discharge a mandatory duty imposed by an enact-
ment, be it a constitutional or charter provision, statute, ordinance, or regulation having the
force of law."). Statutes that have been successfully employed to establish school district lia-
bility include California Government Code section 835 (dangerous condition of public prop-
erty) and Education Code section 44807 (duty to supervise). See Peterson v. San Francisco
Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984) (liability
imposed); see also Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 747, 470 P.2d
360, 363, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1970). But see Rodriguez II, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 230
Cal. Rptr. at 833 (school district held not liable).
39. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cerL denied, 432 U.S. 407
(1977) [hereinafterSerrano II]; see also Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971) [hereinafter Serrano I].
40. 18 Cal. 3d at 767, 557 P.2d at 1052, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
41. Courts have yet to define the parameters of the fundamental right to an education;
Serrano itself was decided within the context of school finance only. However, it can be argued
that the state's Equal Protection Clause has been violated when and if it is shown that educa-
tion for some is better than education for others (either on an individual basis or on a school-
wide basis) because of crime, violence and/or drug abuse on school grounds.
42. 40 Cal. 3d 550, 709 P.2d 1287, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1985).
43. 40 Cal. 3d at 563, 709 P.2d at 563, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 126. Interestingly, the California
court describes this as society's obligation, while the U.S. Supreme Court (see infra note 45 and
accompanying text) specifically refers to the school's obligation to protect pupils.
44. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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years has prompted national concern. 45
Current cases and statutes thus provide school crime victims with a
great deal of support and a variety of rights and remedies. Numerous
strategies are already available to injured plaintiffs, and the districts can-
not help but be aware that the courts will not tolerate half-hearted at-
tempts to maintain orderly public school campuses. Some people,
however, continue to believe that this extensive and wide-ranging body of
law is not sufficient, and look to article I, section 28(c) as a vehicle for yet
another cause of action.46 In light of these ongoing developments, the
following section examines five possible interpretations of subdivision (c).
II. Possible Interpretations of Article I, Section 28(c)
Although the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of Proposition 8, 7 no new light was shed on section 28(c)'s application.48
Since 1982, the Safe Schools Provision has been mentioned in only one
California Supreme Court case, In re William G.,"9 where it was quoted
verbatim by Justice Mosk in a dissenting opinion on the application of
the new reasonable suspicion standard for school searches and seizures."
Several appellate courts in recent years have considered article I,
section 28(c) as a possible "statutory" basis of recovery in cases involving
assaults on school campuses. The disposition of this issue has been in-
conclusive, however, since the cases generally have been decided on other
grounds.51
45. Id. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). (This passage is also quoted by
Justice Mosk in In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d 550, 573, 709 P.2d 1287, 1302, 221 Cal. Rptr.
118, 133 (Mosk, J., dissenting)).
The courts today have recognized that the Fourth Amendment definitely applies to stu-
dents in the public schools. See id. at 557-58, 709 P.2d at 1290-91, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22;
see also Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("Students do not shed
their constitutional rights upon reaching the schoolhouse door.").
Recent cases also emphasize the fact that school officials are "agents of the government"
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See eg., In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 558-60, 709
P.2d at 1291-92, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
46. See Sawyer, supra note 17; Hanelt, Nicholson & Washburn, supra note 15, at 14;
Hosemann, supra note 5; see also infra notes 210-215 and accompanying text.
47. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
48. Subdivision (c) was mentioned only in the context of whether or not there was a
"readily discernible common thread" uniting all the initiative's provisions. Id. at 247, 651
P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36. See infra notes 170-171 and accompanying text.
49. 40 Cal. 3d 550, 709 P.2d 1287, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1985).
50. Id. at 574, 709 P.2d at 1302, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 723 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See infra
note 142 and accompanying text.
51. See Rodriguez II, 186 Cal. App. 3d 707, 230 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1986); Halliman v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist., 163 Cal. App. 3d 46, 209 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1984).
A. Restatement of Existing Law: Elusiveness of the
Safe Schools Provision
The most restrictive interpretation of the Safe Schools Provision is
that it says nothing new or different. Under this position, the language of
article I, section 28(c) would be read to be consistent with current law.
The obligations imposed by current statutes and cases would still be good
law, and would not be superseded by subdivision (c).
Some provisions of state and federal constitutions are so elusive that
courts either will not enforce them at all, or will enforce them in very
limited ways. As Professor Laurence H. Tribe noted in his analysis of
one such elusive provision-the Guaranty Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion52-- the ultimate issue in determining "the ability of the courts to
derive enforceable rights from the constitutional provisions which...
litigants invoke" is "whether it is possible to translate the principles un-
derlying the ... provision... into restrictions ... or affirmative defini-
tions . . . which courts can articulate and apply."53 Sometimes it is
simply impossible to derive enforceable rights from a constitutional pro-
vision. Even though courts continue to pay lip service to the notion that
all parts of constitutions must of necessity mean something,54 certain pro-
visions, by their nature, have little or no impact on legal disputes. 5
52. Article IV, section 4 of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment .... "
53. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73, 76 (1978).
54. See People v. Juarez, 197 Cal. Rptr. 397, 400 (1983) (official opinion ordered depub-
lished), in which the judge declares that although the initiative process has produced some
poorly drafted measures, it is the obligation of the courts to "follow the clearly expressed will
of the people." See also Hosemann, supra note 5, at 21, where Judge Bartalini asserts that
article I, section 28(c) is not merely "a policy statement" (as the Oakland School District
argued), because "[t]o interpret otherwise would make this part of the constitution
purposeless."
55. One such provision is the so-called "right to liberty." The California Constitution
provides that all people "have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending...
liberty." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1. Yet, few California courts have even attempted to construe
this right, and virtually all the cases have been decided against the parties who claimed that
their right to liberty had been violated. See In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141
Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977); Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d. 95, 320 P.2d
473 (1958), rev'don other grounds 359 U.S. 236; In re Rust, 181 Cal. 73, 183 P. 548 (1919);
Grant v. Adams, 69 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1977). Two "turn-of-the-century"
cases actually enforce this right, but only as justifications for the well-settled rule of "freedom
ofcontract." See Exparte West, 147 Cal. 774, 82 P. 434 (1905); Exparte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763,
82 P. 429 (1905).
Professor Ronald Dworkin argues that in fact there is no such thing as right to liberty in
our society. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 267, 269 (1977).
Another elusive provision is the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
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In Hosemann, the most recent Safe Schools Provision controversy,
the litigant and his supporters are asserting that article I, section 28(c)
must necessarily, as part of the California Constitution, provide a cause
of action to obtain relief.5 6 However, the courts could reasonably hold
that no enforceable rights can be derived from article I, section 28(c).
The provision is simply too elusive because of the indefinite nature of the
term "right," the inconclusive and contradictory will of the people, and
the restatement nature of Proposition 8 language.
1. The Indefinite Nature of the Word "Right"
Since article I, section 28(c) is entitled "Right to Safe Schools," any
inquiry into its interpretation must include an analysis of the word
"right." Indeed, few words are more prevalent in legal writing. Use of
the word in an enactment, however, does not guarantee anything.
Courts have long recognized that the word "right," in and of itself, is an
indefinite, generic term, 7 "broad enough to embrace whatever may be
lawfully claimed."5 " In fact, the California Supreme Court has drawn a
distinction between legal rights and "inchoate" rights, indicating that not
all rights give rise to remedies: "[i]f the person asserting a claim can
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. AMEND. IX. This Amend-
ment, "both as a source of rights and ... as a justification for judicial definition of nontextual'
fundamental rights," has been the subject of much controversy. 2 ROTUNDA, NOWAK &
YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81 n.10 (1986). In Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), for example, Justice Goldberg referred to it as "the forgotten Ninth
Amendment." Id. at 490 n.6 (Goldberg, J., joined by Chief Justice Warren & Justice Brennan,
concurring).
The problem of applying this difficult Amendment surfaced in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), where the Court rejected the argument that the Ninth Amendment could be a basis for
a woman's right to an abortion. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas (whose description
in Griswold of the penumbras emanating from the Bill of Rights arguably pointed toward a
liberal interpretation of any amendment's guarantees, see 381 U.S. at 484) declared that "the
Ninth Amendment obviously does not create federally enforceable rights." Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. at 210 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Still another example of an elusive provision is the Guaranty Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See supra note 52. Professor Tribe, in discussing the line of cases from Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), points out that the courts
have relied on the political question doctrine to find the Guaranty Clause generally unenforce-
able, and that the doctrine itself is simply part of a larger question: "whether the Constitution
provides a cause of action a litigant can assert to obtain the requested judicial relief." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79 n.41 (1978).
56. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
57. See Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 546, 27 S.E.2d 38, 545
(1943), Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 287, 306 (1871). See also Pinkham v. Unborn
Children of Jather Pinkham, 227 N.C. 72, 40 S.E.2d 690, 695 (1946), Weekley v. Weekley, 126
W. Va. 90, 96, 27 S.E.2d 591, 594 (1943).
58. Bankers Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Wyatt, 139 Tex. 173, 162 S.W.2d 694, 696
(1942).
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predict with certainty that it will be enforced by the courts, he has a legal
right-otherwise, his claim remains an inchoate 'right' without a
remedy."5 9
Professor Ronald Dworkin's distinction between abstract and con-
crete rights is particularly helpful. An abstract right, he explains, is a
general aim, "the statement of which does not indicate how that general
aim is to be weighed or compromised in particular circumstances against
other... aims.... The grand rights of political rhetoric are in this way
abstract."60 Concrete rights, on the other hand, are aims that are "more
precisely defined so as to express more definitely the weight they have
against other aims on particular occasions."'"
Nowhere in the language of article I, section 28 is there a precise
definition of this "right" to safe schools. The authors of Proposition 8
appear to be relying on what Professor Peter Westen calls "the rhetoric
of rights,"6 since "everything else being equal.., we prefer to argue in
favor of rights [rather] than against them."63 All the words defining the
parameters of the "right" in the Safe Schools Provision are broad and
overly general and do not provide assistance in interpreting the provi-
sion. The terms are widely used in grand political rhetoric because they
invoke moving images that all of us can embrace."
Because the language of subdivision (c) is so indefinite and fails to
indicate how its "general aim" is to be weighed against other aims, the
courts could reasonably conclude that the right to safe schools, in its
present form, is nothing more than an abstract, inchoate right.
2. The Will of the People
In construing a constitutional provision, courts look carefully at the
59. Estate of Gogabashvele, 195 Cal. App. 2d 503, 525, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77, 91 (1961).
60. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 93 (1977).
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights, " 33 UCLA L. REv. 977, 978 (1986).
63. Id. at 977.
64. Perhaps the most famous use of the term "inalienable" (in its archaic form) can be
found in the archetypal imagery of the United States Declaration of Independence: "that [all
men] are endowed by their Creator with certain Unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." As Westen notes:
The language of rights tends to persuade not by illuminating the matters at issue, but
by concealing them through linguistic sleight of hand. The rhetoric of rights derives
its force from a deep-seated ambiguity in the ordinary meaning of the word
"rights"-an ambiguity that causes disputing parties to assume away the very issues
they purport to be addressing. The ambiguity is latent and hence does its work unde-
tected (indeed, the ambiguity works precisely because it is undetected).
Westen, supra note 62, at 978 (emphasis in original).
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original intent behind its adoption.65 Generally, the intent of the voters
and the drafters is considered in the case of an initiative measure. 66
A preferred method of ascertaining the popular will regarding a spe-
cific proposition is to look closely at the California Ballot Pamphlet67 and
attempt to project, from the arguments and summaries, just what the
voters might have intended. 68 The June 1982 ballot pamphlet, however,
contains no explanation of the Safe Schools Provision. The legislative
analysis says only that article I, section 28(c) provides a right to safe
schools.69 This is eminently clear from reading the actual text of the
provision. Moreover, no specific arguments for subdivision (c) are listed
in the pamphlet, and the Safe Schools Provision is not even mentioned by
the proponents of Proposition 8.70
65. See People v. Valentine, 42 Cal. 3d 170, 720 P.2d 913, 228 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1986). See
also Baumbaugh v. San Diego County, 44 Cal. App. 2d 898, 113 P.2d 218 (1941); Kaiser v.
Hopkins, 6 Cal. App. 2d 537, 58 P.2d 1278 (1936).
For a thorough analysis of the "Original Intent" theory as applied to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, see Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and
Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 5 HASTINGS CONsr. L.Q. 603 (1978).
66. See People v. Valentine, 42 Cal. 3d at 177, 720 P.2d at 917, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 29
(defining the framers as "the drafters and the voters", before analyzing "the intent of the
people" regarding various provisions of Proposition 8); see also Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal.
3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982) ("[the courts] should not prohibit the sovereign
people from either expressing or implementing their own will on matters of such... impor-
tance ... as their own perceived safety.").
67. California Ballot Pamphlets are compiled by the Secretary of State and provide the
following information for each state proposition: the ballot title, a short summary, the Legisla-
tive Analyst's analysis, pro and con arguments and rebuttals, and the complete text of the
proposition itself. These pamphlets are mailed by the state to all registered voters.
68. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 888 n.8, 694 P.2d 744, 753 n.8, 210 Cal. Rptr.
631, 640 n.8 (1985); see also Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829
n.1, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 n.1 (1976).
Legislative committee reports, often so useful in both statutory and constitutional inter-
pretation, are non-existent for initiative measures.
69. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 302 app., 651 P.2d. at 316 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 72 app..
The appendix to this case contains a complete reproduction of the 1982 California Ballot Pam-
phlet text relating to Proposition 8, including the analysis of subdivision (c) by the legislative
analyst:
"Safe Schools. The Constitution currently provides that all people have the inaliena-
ble right of "pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." In addition,
statutory law prohibits various acts upon school grounds which disturb the peace of
students or staff, or which disrupt the peaceful conduct of school activities. This
measure would add a section to the State Constitution declaring that students and
staff of public elementary and secondary schools have the "inalienable right to attend
campuses which are safe, secure, and peaceful."
Id.
70. See id. at 305-06 app., 651 P.2d at 319-20 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 75-76 app. The only
mention of article I, section 28(c) in any of the ballot arguments is by critics of Proposition 8.
See infra notes 111 & 275 and accompanying text.
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Subdivision (c) is literally hidden within a lengthy proposition that
is portrayed by its backers as a landmark in the long, arduous struggle
for criminal justice, the rights of victims, and truth-in-evidence.7 1 One
can only wonder how many people actually knew they were voting for an
initiative that had anything to do with school safety, let alone for an
affirmative duty that would make it easier to hold schools liable in a wide
variety of contexts.72
In Hosemann,73 the trial court declared that the voters intended not
only "to improve school safety... and to provide a civil remedy in dam-
ages to those... injured by failure to provide safe, secure, and peaceful
schools," but also "to require increased security expenditures."74  The
court's reasoning appears to be that because the legislative analyst pre-
dicted possible increased claims and greater costs if subdivision (c)
passed,75 voters reading this fiscal analysis would vote for Proposition 8
if they believed that there should be increased claims and greater security
CoStS.
7 6
This line of analysis is seriously flawed. People do not generally
vote for an initiative because of the possibilities of increased claims and
costs described in the fiscal analysis section. 77  They tend to base their
decisions on the text of the initiative itself in light of certain key, widely-
71. Former Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb's words are typical of the arguments for the
initiative: "It is time for the people to take decisive action against violent crime. For too long
our courts and the professional politicians in Sacramento have demonstrated more concern
with the rights of criminals than with the rights of innocent victims." Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d
at 305 app., 651 P.2d at 319 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 75 app.
72. The initiative process in California has been the subject of much controversy during
the past decade, with people on both ends of the political spectrum questioning the efficacy of
this method of "participatory democracy." For an excellent presentation of this inquiry, see
generally Walters, Public Policy Gridlock: The Initiative as Decidedly Bad Lawmaking, L.A.
Daily Journal, July 14, 1986, at 4, col. 3 ("The initiative is now less a tool for expression of
popular will than a device used by special interests, fringe groups, and others."). But see Peo-
ple v. Juarez, 197 Cal. Rptr. 397, 400 (1983):
One possible shortcoming of the initiative process is that the drafting of propositions
may, at worst, be sloppy and, at best, not be carried out with the precision expected
in legislative enactments. Our review of Proposition 8 in general ... leads us to
conclude that its draftsmanship leaves much to be desired. Poor draftsmanship,
however, is no reason to refuse to follow [it].
73. Hosemann, supra note 5.
74. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
75. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 304 app., 651 P.2d at 318 app., 221 Cal. Rptr. at 74 app.
The legislative analyst wrote in the ballot pamphlet that subdivision (c) "could ... increase
claims against state and local governments relating to enforcement of the right to safe schools,
[and could] increase school security costs to provide safe schools." Id. (emphasis added).
76. See Hosemann, supra note 5, at 30.
77. See Note, The California Initiative Process A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 922, 934 (1975) [hereinafter Note, The California Initiative Process]: "There are two
factors which greatly inhibit [the electorate's] thoughtful consideration of the issues presented
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publicized arguments. 78  Additionally, an inference that voters support
increased claims and costs because they vote for an initiative that the
legislative analyst says might cause such increases is questionable.79 In
fact, an argument can be made that the voters in 1982 wanted safer
schools, but hoped that this could be accomplished without increased
claims or costs. 80
It must be emphasized that the whole area of fiscal analysis and the
perceived popular will is often speculative and rarely absolute. The legis-
lative analyst himself stressed the uncertain nature of his predictions."'
Because of this uncertainty, the text of a voter's guide can be used "as an
aid," but its language is not necessarily determinative.8 2
by all but the most simple initiative: the complexity of the ballot measure and the nature of the
political campaign waged in its behalf." Id. (emphasis added).
78. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 305-06 app., 651 P.2d at 319-20 app., 221 Cal. Rptr. at
75-76 app. Mr. Gann concludes with the following words:
[The people] are not only victims of crime, they are victims of our criminal justice
system-the liberal reformers, lenient judges and behavior modification do-gooders
who release hardened criminals again and again to victimize the innocent. It's time
to restore justice to the system. Vote yes for victims' rights. Vote yes on Proposition
8.
79. In recent times, voters have rarely backed measures that require increased costs (and
possible increases in taxes). Key propositions promulgated by Mr. Gann, for example, includ-
ing Proposition 13 in 1978 and Proposition 4 in 1979, gained popular support because the
California voters, upset by increasingly higher taxes, wanted to see less money spent by public
entities. Arguably these same participants in the so-called "taxpayer's revolt" provided key
votes for Proposition 8 in 1982.
80. The voters' recent support of Proposition 51, the "deep pockets" initiative designed to
limit the liability of such public entities as school districts, is an indication that people would
not want to see such "increased claims."
Proposition 51, the "Multiple Defendant Tort Damage Liability Initiative Statute' ap-
proved by California voters in June 1986, amended Civil Code section 1431 (joint liability),
and added new sections 1431.1-1431.5 (several liability for non-economic damages and sever-
ability in general). See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431, 1431.1-1431.5 (West Supp. 1987).
81. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 304 app., 651 P.2d at 318 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 74 app.
("The net fiscal effect of this measure cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. This
is because [it] would depend on many factors that cannot be predicted. Specifically, it would
depend on ... how various provisions are implemented by the... school districts." (emphasis
added)).
82. See Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829 n.1, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 842 n.1 (1976). For a detailed explanation of the difficulties involved in relying on
the ballot pamphlet to discern voter intent, especially regarding complex initiative measures
such as Proposition 8, see In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 910, 694 P.2d 744, 769, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 631, 656 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (1985).
When a ballot proposal is lengthy "only the most diligent voter [will] wade through
[it]." . . . The busy voter does not have the time to devote to the study of long,
wordy, [sic] propositions.... If improper emphasis is placed upon one feature and
the remaining features ignored, or if there is a failure to study the entire proposed
amendment, the voter may be misled as to the over-all effect of the proposed
amendment.
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The intent of the drafters is equally nebulous. As indicated above 3
the authors of Proposition 8 said absolutely nothing about their intent in
the June 1982 California Ballot Pamphlet. Although Mr. Gann wrote
one of the three arguments in favor of the initiative 4 and was the sole
author of the rebuttal to the arguments against it,85 no references can be
found regarding the Safe Schools Provision. 6
Rather than relying on nebulous notions of intent, courts should
consider the express language of the statute. The text of subdivision (c)
itself made no mention of affirmative duty or increased liability. "A
broad, general, undefined right to safe schools was described... nothing
more."8 Furthermore, extrinsic evidence reveals that the co-authors of
Proposition 8 stand for opposing points of view on the key issue of cost.
In a recent article, Judge Nicholson declared that his "clear intent" was
"to mandate necessary security for all California public schools, at all
levels, regardless of cost."8 Mr. Gann, however, more than anyone else
in the state, personifies the so-called "taxpayer revolt" and its accompa-
nying demand that public entities find a way to spend less money. 9
If it can be shown that the framers (both the voters and the drafters)
intended a specific, concrete, enforceable right, then subdivision (c) could
not be deemed elusive. However, an analysis of this issue reveals that the
framers' intent is at best contradictory, and at worst unfathomable.
3. The "Restatement Effect" of the Proposition 8 Language
In addition to the indefinite nature of the word "right" and the in-
conclusive will of the people regarding article I, section 28(c), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has recognized a problem with respect to
Proposition 8 language in general. In the recent case of People v. Valen-
tine,90 the court conceded that "several provisions of Proposition 8 are
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Note, The California Initiative Process, supra note 77, at 934).
See also Zimmerman, The Campaign That Couldn't Win, L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1986, § 5,
at 6, col. 3 (bemoaning "the absence of an informed electorate").
83. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
84. .Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 305 app., 651 P.2d at 319 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 75 app..
85. Id. at 306 app., 651 P.2d at 320 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 76 app.
86. The silence surrounding subdivision (c) leads one to wonder whether or not the au-
thors had anything specific in mind when they added the right to safe schools to this wide-
ranging proposition.
87. See generally Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 302 app., 651 P.2d at 316 app., 186 Cal. Rptr.
at 72 app.
88. Hanelt, Nicholson & Washburn, supra note 15, at 14.
89. See e.g., M. Oliver, Gann Again, 6 CAL. LAW. 48 (Nov. 1986); R. Ulrich, Promises,
Promises. Are Jarvis and Gann as Good as Their Words?, L.A. Daily Journal, June 27, 1986,
§ 1, at 4, col. 3. See also supra notes 14 & 79.
90. 42 Cal. 3d 170, 720 P.2d 913, 228 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1986).
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'cosmetic,' since they simply restated existing law." 91 While rejecting the
defendant's claim that the provision in question (disclosing the nature of
a prior felony) constituted a restatement, Justice Grodin explained that
"in the examples defendant cites, the 'restatement' effect of the Proposi-
tion 8 language is apparent from its terms. Defendant fails to show how
section 28(f)'s language, which seems directly contrary to 'existing law,'
has merely 'restated' it."92
Although the court in Valentine did not mention the Safe Schools
Provision, the broad language of the decision indicates that other provi-
sions of section 28 might be held to have merely restated existing law.
The repeated references to the entire proposition, rather than just article
I, section 28(f), plus the concession that in fact "several provisions of
Proposition 8 are 'cosmetic' lead to a conclusion that other subdivisions
might also be deemed 'cosmetic'" if (1) the restatement language is ap-
parent from their terms, and/or (2) the provisions are shown to have
merely restated existing law.9"
Subdivision (c) itself does nothing more than restate existing law.
The California Constitution already contains a general right to safety:
"All people.., have inalienable rights. Among these are... pursuing
and obtaining safety."194 In addition, the California Civil Code provides
further statutory protection: "the right of protection from bodily re-
straint or harm. '95
Proponents of Proposition 8 might contend that by including the
word "schools" in this right to safety, voters have created specific new
protection when only general protection had previously existed. The lan-
guage of the preamble, after all, states that "public safety extends to pub-
lic . . . school campuses."96 Arguably, however, this langauge also
merely restates existing law. School campuses would be one of thefirst
places the courts would look to apply a right to safety that has existed in
91. Id. at 178, 720 P.2d at 917, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. While discussing whether or not article I, section 28(f) should be deemed "cosmetic,"
Justice Grodin stated the following: ". . . in the examples defendant cites, the 'restatement'
effect of the Proposition 8 language is apparent from its terms." Id. at 178, 720 P.2d at 917,
228 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (emphasis added). See supra note 92 and accompanying text. This obser-
vation leads implicitly to the conclusion that other provisions could be deemed cosmetic if the
restatement language is apparent from their terms.
Similarly, Justice Grodin noted that the defendant failed "to show how section 28(f)'s
language, which seems directly contrary to 'existing law,' has merely 'restated' it." Id. at 178,
720 P.2d at 917, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (emphasis added). Provisions could thus be deemed
cosmetic if shown to be mere restatement of existing law.
94. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
95. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43 (West 1982).
96. CAL. CONSr. art. I, § 28(a).
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the California Constitution and the Civil Code since the 1800's, given the
large number of relatively weak and defenseless persons to be found in a
school setting.
It is clear that there is a problem with the Proposition 8 language.
In People v. Juarez,97 decided soon after Proposition 8's passage, the
Court of Appeal stated: "Our review of Proposition 8 in general...
leads us to conclude that its draftsmanship leaves much to be desired."9
8
Moreover, the California Supreme Court's recent discussion of "the re-
statement' effect of Proposition 8 language" in Valentine99 further sup-
ports the argument that article I, section 28(c) is yet another elusive
constitutional provision.
Subdivision (c) is simply too indefinite to be of any use to the courts
at the present time. Too many questions have been raised regarding the
language of Proposition 8 and the "framers' intent." It is thus reasonable
to conclude that the Safe Schools Provision is nothing more than a re-
statement of existing law, from which the courts may not derive addi-
tional rights.
B. Not Self-Executing: A Call for Implementing Legislation
A second interpretation of article I, section 28(c) is that it represents
an invitation to the legislature to come up with a statutory scheme for
implementing the provision. A court following this position might base
its decision on a literal reading of Chief Justice Marshall's words in Mar-
bury v. Madison: "[ift cannot be presumed that any clause in the consti-
tution is to be without effect."' "° The court would thus reject the
implication that the voters did not consider the Safe Schools Provision
when they voted for Proposition 8.101
The key issue under this interpretation is whether or not the Safe
97. 197 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1983) (official opinion ordered depublished).
98. Id. at 400.
99. 42 Cal. 3d 170, 178, 720 P.2d 913, 917, 228 Cal. Rptr. 25, 29 (1980).
100. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
101. See supra notes 71-72, 82 and accompanying text. Generally, voters are presumed to
have intended to be bound by all the provisions of any initiative they have approved. See
Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 252, 651 P.2d 274, 283-84, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39-40
(1982) (quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 243-44, 583 P.2d 1281, 1299, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 256-57 (1978)). "[W]e ordina-
rily should assume that the voters who approved a constitutional amendment... have voted
intelligently upon an amendment to their organic law, the whole text of which was supplied
each of them prior to the election and which they must be assumed to have duly considered.").
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Schools Provision is self-executing."12 If a constitutional provision is not
self-executing, then legislation is necessary "to give it a reasonable and
practical operation" before it can be implemented. 103 California courts
have established specific guidelines for determining whether a provision
is self-executing. First, the provision must be clear, precise and unambig-
uous. It must supply "a sufficient rule by means of which the right given
may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced."" °
A provision does not supply a sufficient rule, however, "when it merely
indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of which those
principles may be given the force of law."'05
No explicit rule has been supplied by which the broad, general lan-
guage of subdivision (c) can be enforced. As Justice Mosk wrote in Bros-
nahan v. Eu,1 06 in analyzing the language of the Safe Schools Provision,
"[a] voter.., would reasonably expect that a lengthy amendment which
states... that 'students and staff have the right to be safe and secure in
their persons' on campus would.., propose some protection of that right
in its substantive provisions."10 7 However, the language of article I, sec-
tion 28(c) provides no clues as to how the right to safe schools would be
"protected." Thus the legislature has the burden to establish a statutory
scheme that would spell out exactly how the provision would be
102. "A constitutional provision is self-executing when it is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplemental or enabling legislation." State ex rel. Russell v.
Bliss, 156 Ohio St. 147, 152, 101 N.E.2d 289, 291 (1951).
Examples of provisions that have generally been deemed self-executing include the prohi-
bition against taking property for public use without just compensation (Pacific Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co. v. City of Burbank, 86 Cal. App. 3d 5, 149 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1978)), the right to
propose constitutional amendments by petition (Wolverine Golf Club v. Hare, 384 Mich. 461,
185 N.W.2d 392 (1971)), and a provision that right and justice shall be administered without
delay (Perkins v. Cooper, 155 Okla. 73, 4 P.2d 64 (1931)).
Provisions that have been held not self-executing include the federal fifth amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination (Roberts v. U.S., 445 U.S. 552 (1980)), a provi-
sion authorizing change of venue in certain cases (Older v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 770, 109
P. 478 (1910)), and the provision of the federal constitution providing for the extradition of a
fugitive from justice (In re Tenner, 20 Cal. 2d 670, 128 P.2d 338 (1942)). Constitutional provi-
sions that are not self-executing remain inoperative until supplemental legislation renders them
effective. State ex rel. Cotter v. Leipner, 138 Conn. 153, 83 A.2d 169 (1951).
103. See French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 513, 543 (1864).
104. Flood v. Riggs, 80 Cal. App. 3d 138, 154, 145 Cal. Rptr. 573, 582 (1978) (emphasis
added).
105. Older v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 770, 780, 109 P. 478, 482 (1910) (citation omitted);
see also Stockton Civic Theatre v. Board of Supervisors of San Joaquin County, 66 Cal.2d 13,
423 P.2d 810, 56 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1967).
106. 31 Cal. 3d 1, 641 P.2d 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1982).
107. Id. at 11-12, 641 P.2d at 206, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (Mosk, J., concurring & dissent-
ing) (emphasis added).
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enforced.'"
The indefinite nature of the word "right"'1 9 and the inconclusive
will of the people' 10 are both problems relevant to the determination of
whether article I, section 28(c) is self-executing. As Stanley M. Roden,
former District Attorney of Santa Barbara County, stated in the 1982
California Ballot Pamphlet, "[n]obody knows what the so-called 'safe-
schools' section means. The likely result of this provision is constant
court battles over compliance."'' These court battles can be avoided if
the legislature steps in at this point in time.' 1 2
108. Arguably, the State Legislature has already taken the first steps toward implementing
article I, section 28(c). In 1982, Chapter 395 was added to Penal Code section 627 (which
already restricted the access of unauthorized persons into school campuses), authorizing
school principals to refuse or revoke an outsider's registration, CAL. PENAL CODE § 627.4
(West Supp. 1987), and establishing a new misdemeanor for refusal to leave school grounds,
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 627.7, 627.8(a) (West Supp. 1987). A new section was also added to the
legislative declaration, stating that "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter
... to thereby implement the provisions of Section 28 of Article I ... which guarantee all
students and staff the inalienable constitutional right to attend safe, secure, and peaceful public
schools." CAL. PENAL CODE § 627(c) (West Supp. 1987). In 1985, Chapter 1457 was added
to the Education Code, expressly recognizing "that all pupils enrolled in the state public
schools have the inalienable right to attend classes on campuses which are safe, secure, and
peaceful." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32261 (West Supp. 1987). This new chapter mandated the
establishment of interagency safe school model programs for 1985-86 and 1986-87, and en-
couraged "school districts, county offices of education, and law enforcement agencies to de-
velop and implement interagency strategies, programs, and activities which will... reduce the
rates of school crime and vandalism." CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 32261-32262, 32270-32274 (West
Supp. 1987).
Chapter 483 was also added to the Penal Code in 1984, increasing punishment to a $2,000
fine, one year in prison, or both, for an assault or battery committed against any person on
school grounds. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 241.2, 241.3, 243.3 (West Supp. 1987). However, no
reference to article I, section 28(c) was included in this addition.
109. See supra note 55.
110. See supra notes 65-89 and accompanying text.
111. Gilbert, Roden & Goggin, Argument Against Proposition 8, reprinted in Brosnahan, 32
Cal. 3d at 306 app., 651 P.2d at 320 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 76 app.
112. California lawmakers are beginning to recognize the need for supplemental and en-
abling legislation in connection with article 1, section 28(c). On March 3, 1987, Oakland
Assemblyman Elihu Harris introduced Assembly Bill (AB) 1172, the "Safe Schools Act of
1987." Amended in Assembly on April 6, 1987, this bill would add Article 16 (commencing
with Section 35360) to Chapter 3 of Part 21 of the Education Code.
Without expressly saying so, AB 1172 appears to recognize that the Safe Schools Provi-
sion is not self-executing: Other than the specific criminal law provisions contained in the
Victims' Bill of Rights, the people provided no detail as to the manner in which subdivision (c)
of section 28 of article I of the California Constitution should be implemented. Cal. A.B. 1172,
1987 Cal. Legis. Serv. 96-40 (West).
The proposed section 35361 of the Education Code outlines the intent and purpose of this
new legislation, including the following goals: providing "students, parents, teachers, staff,
and administrators with a recommended procedure for... resolving school safety problems,"
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The nature of a provision can also be determined by an analysis of
its language. If its language is "prohibitory", it is generally deemed self-
executing." 3 Article I, section 28(c), however, does not specifically pro-
hibit anything; the right to safe schools is described in positive terms. A
provision is only self-executing when "a complete rule" is spelled out,
"broad enough [in its terms] to embrace and definitely settle all condi-
tions.""'  As it stands now, nothing specific is either prohibited or re-
quired by the Safe Schools Provision. The legislature must define the
specific acts that would be prohibited, and/or the specific acts that would
be required.
Finally, some courts will presume that a constitutional provision is
self-executing, unless it appears that legislation is required." 5 Fenton v.
Groveland Community Services District 6 provides a recent example of a
decision based on this presumption. In determining whether or not the
right to vote under the California Constitution" 7 was self-executing, the
court concluded that "the right to vote ... clearly does not require en-
abling legislation.""' '
A right to vote is implemented simply by allowing disenfranchised
people to vote, and/or penalizing those who prevent qualified voters
from exercising their right. This remedy is clearly discernible; no legisla-
tion is required to spell it out. The nebulous right to safe schools, how-
encouraging "the solution of school safety problems at the school site level," and minimizing
"court intervention in the local handling of school safety matters." Id. at 96-100.
In a key passage that is arguably included because of such recent developments as the
Hosemann decision (see infra notes 208-215 and accompanying text), AB 1172 recognizes that
"[local educational] agencies cannot be guarantors of the safety of students, teachers, or staff
from risks that could not have been reasonably anticipated or corrected, and that subdivision
(c) ... does not change the traditional tort liability of local educational agencies for injuries
caused by their negligence or the negligence of their employees." Id. (emphasis added).
113. See Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 P. 3 (1886).
114. French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518, 540 (1864).
115. See Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d 797, 805, 185
Cal. Rptr. 758, 762 (1982); Flood v. Riggs, 80 Cal. App. 3d 138, 145 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1978).
This modem presumption appears to stem from a change in the way constitutions are
constructed. See McMurray, Some Tendencies in Constitution Making, 2 CALIF. L. Rav. 203
(1913-14): "From being a mere scheme or plan of government, the constitutions of later time
have become, in large part, codes of statutory law .... Indeed, so far has this tendency upon
the part of the people to enact legislation in the form of constitutional amendments extended,
that courts have been obliged to recognize this phenomenon, and to change their theory of
constitutional interpretation." Id. at 209.
116. 135 Cal. App. 3d 797, 805, 185 Cal. Rptr. 758, 762 (1982).
117. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2.
118. 135 Cal. App. 3d at 805, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 762 (emphasis added). The court referred
to the "special dignity accorded the rights of free speech and free press," which "afforded
plaintiffs the right to seek damages without enabling legislation. The right to vote is no less
worthy of protection." Id.
SAFE SCHOOLS PROVISION
ever, does not suggest any remedy. No specific methods of
implementation are either expressed or implied in the entire section 28 of
article I. As Chief Justice Bird pointed out in Brosnahan v. Brown, 
119
"[regarding] the provision creating a right to safe schools[,] ... [nJone of
the otherprovisions... are even remotely connected to implementing that
right. o120
The judge in Hosemann 2 argued that article I, section 28(c) must
be self-executing, relying on the recent decisions in Porten v. University of
San Francisco122 and Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation
of Laguna Hills. 123 The plaintiff in Porten alleged that the university
violated his right to privacy"24 by disclosing his grades from an out-of-
state school to the State Scholarship and Loan Commission. The plain-
tiff in Laguna Publishing Co. alleged that the Golden Rain Foundation
violated his right to free speech/free press 125 by preventing delivery of
the Laguna News Post at Rossmoor Leisure World. In both cases, the
rights were deemed self-executing and the court found for the plaintiff.
Judge Bartalini's reasoning in Hosemann appears to be that if other
judges in recent civil rights cases concluded, with little or no analysis,
that these rights must have been self-executing, the right to safe schools
should also be deemed self-executing.12
6
However, neither the right to privacy nor the right to free speech are
comparable to the "new" right in subdivision (c). Both are traditional
119. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
120. Id. at 274, 651 P.2d at 297, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
121. See supra note 5.
122. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
123. 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1982).
124. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
125. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2.
126. See Hosemann, supra note 5, at 30-31. Judge Bartalini uses Kimberly Sawyer's Pacific
Law Journal article, see supra note 17, as his direct source here: "Ms. Sawyer's article outlines
existing law through which the subject constitutional provisions may be interpreted. Ms. Saw-
yer analogizes the inalienable right conferred by these constitutional provisions with a line of
cases wherein it has been held the right to privacy is self-executing and therefore confers judi-
cial right of action on all Californians." Hosemann, supra note 5, at 30-31.
Ms. Sawyer herself writes the following: "California courts have held that other inaliena-
ble rights are self-executing, such as the right to privacy [Porten] and the right to free speech
and press [Laguna]. The courts are generally conclusionary, stating only that the provision is
self-executing, but their conclusion is appropriate for the following reason. A self-executing
provision is one that is in effect immediately and does not depend on the Legislature to give it
life. An inalienable right is also, by definition, not dependent on the Legislature for existence,
for inalienable rights are not granted by the government but inherent in every person. The
courts, therefore, are justified in concluding that inalienable rights are self-executing." Saw-
yer, supra note 17, at 1322.
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rights that have been accorded "special dignity" 12 7 and embody clearly
defined remedies, while the right to safe schools suggests no clear reme-
dies. If any part of the state constitution is analogous to subdivision(c), it
is the state's duty to educate its children,12 since both sections focus on
obligations of the schools. The courts have long held that the duty to
educate is not self-executing, and must be implemented by statute.1 29
The Safe Schools Provision contains only a broad, general principle;
it gives us no guidelines as to how this principle should be applied. Other
rights that have been deemed self-executing by the courts suggest clear
remedies, but article I, section 28(c) does not suggest, either expressly or
impliedly, any discernible remedies. The self-executing issue cannot be
taken for granted. Some new provisions simply require legislation before
they can be implemented. It is reasonable to conclude that article I, sec-
tion 28(c) is not self-executing. Under this interpretation, until the legis-
lature defines the specific acts that would be prohibited and/or the
specific acts that would be required, the Safe Schools Provision can have
no effect.
C. Fewer Procedural Rights and Safeguards in a School Setting
A third interpretation of article I, section 28(c) is that it maximizes
school safety by making it easier to prosecute those who commit crimes
on school grounds. This position represents a reasonable middle ground
between the interpretation that article I, section 28(c) is simply a restate-
ment and the interpretation that it imposes an affirmative duty to make
schools safe no matter what the cost.
The law is well-settled that whenever the language of a constitution
admits of doubt, construction should follow the spirit and purpose of the
instrument. 30 Although the court in Brosnahan v. Brown 3' upheld the
constitutionality of Proposition 8, its decision arguably points toward a
limiting interpretation of article I, section 28(c) by delineating the spirit
and purpose of the Vicitims' Bill of Rights:
Each of [Proposition 8's] several facets bears a common concern
[.. T]he 10 sections were designed to strengthen procedural and
substantive safeguards for victims in our criminal justice sys-
tem.... This goal is the readily discernible common thread which
127. See Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d 797, 805, 185
Cal. Rptr. 758, 762 (1982).
128. See CAL. CONST. art. IX.
129. See People v. Board of Education of Oakland, 55 Cal. 331, 336-37 (1880); Gonzales v.
State, 29 Cal. App. 3d 585, 592, 105 Cal. Rptr. 804, 808 (1972).
130. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 289 (1900) (emphasis added).
131. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 275, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
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unites all of the initiative's provisions in advancing its common
purpose.
132
The Brosnahan court also attempted to define what the word
"safety" in section 28(c) really means: "The rights of victims [in Propo-
sition 8] include ... the expectation that 'persons who commit felonious
acts' shall be detained, tried and punished so that the public safety is pro-
tected. . . . 'Such public safety extends to . . . school campuses.' "133
Thus it becomes apparent that "safety" in Proposition 8 means protec-
tion of the public through detention, trial and punishment of felons.
Neither this "definition" nor Brosnahan's explanation of the purpose be-
hind the provision show any intent to provide a civil cause of action for
those injured on school property.
Arguably, when the people approved Proposition 8, they voted for
subdivision (c) within the context of the Victims' Bill of Rights/Truth-in-
Evidence law. This analysis was suggested by the courts in Halliman v.
Los Angeles Unified School District 134 and Gordon v. Santa Ana Unified
School District.135 In these two cases, the courts examined possible appli-
cations of the Safe Schools Provision. Both courts concluded that article
I, section 28(c) applied to criminal cases rather than civil disputes, and
both agreed that it mandated a less lenient, more uncompromising ap-
proach in the procedural treatment of accused and convicted persons.
Under this analysis, consistent with Halliman, Gordon, and In re Wil-
liam G.,136 the Safe Schools Provision only means that people commit-
ting crimes on school grounds should have fewer procedural rights and
safeguards.
In Halliman, the court held that a teacher who had been assaulted
by a student on school grounds could not recover under subdivision (c),
because the Safe Schools Provision is limited to procedural matters in the
criminal justice system and does not create an exception to the exclusive
remedy of the worker's compensation statute. 137 The court determined
that article I, section 28(c) was concerned with "'the broad reforms in
the procedural treatment of accused persons and the disposition and sen-
tencing of convicted persons' sought in the state's criminal justice sys-
132. Id. at 247, 651 P.2d at 297, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 24748, 651 P.2d at 280-81, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 28(a)) (emphasis added).
134. 163 Cal. App. 3d 46, 209 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1984).
135. 162 Cal. App. 3d 530, 208 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1984).
136. 40 Cal. 3d 550, 709 P.2d 1278, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1985). See supra notes 42-43, 45
& 49-50 and accompanying text.
137. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 52, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
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tern," not with a teacher's ability to recover against a school district.13
In Gordon, the court found the exclusionary rule inapplicable in a
high school disciplinary proceeding and upheld the one-year suspension
of a student for possession of marijuana which had been discovered by
the assistant principal. 13 9 Unlike Halliman, article I, section 28(c) was
cited by the court in support of its position."4 Like Halliman, however,
article I, section 28(c) was applied to procedural matters in the criminal
justice system.14 1
In In re William G., the California Supreme Court adopted the rea-
sonable suspicion standard for student searches and seizures. Justice
Mosk, agreeing with the adoption of this looser standard but disagreeing
with the court's application of it in the case, emphasized the importance
of the Safe Schools Provision in support of his position that evidence
should be more easily obtainable in a school setting: "[we] must also
realize that innocent, law-abiding students have a constitutional right to
protection from crime and criminals, and are entitled to a safe school
environment. The people of California made that clear when they
adopted article I, section 28, subdivision (c) . . ""4 Once again, the
Safe Schools Provision is cited in the context of a criminal proceeding,
not a civil action.
Since this interpretation represents an intermediate position, it could
be attacked by both proponents and critics of Proposition 8. One side
could claim that it does not go far enough, and call for stronger interpre-
tations. 4 The other side would undoubtedly object to the curtailing of
civil liberties that might occur if this position were followed.'" While
138. Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(a)) (emphasis added). See also People v. Cam-
pos, 183 Cal. App. 3d 926, 934, 228 Cal. Rptr. 470, 475 (1986) ("The obvious purpose of
Proposition 8 was to conform California's criminal procedure law to federal law").
139. 162 Cal. App. 3d at 544, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67.
140. "[We do not discount.., the duty of the school administration to protect law abiding
students from delinquents among them, an obligation recently emphasized by the electorate
[CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 28, subd. (c)]. Consequently... we hold the exclusionary rule inappli-
cable in high school disciplinary proceedings." Id. (emphasis added).
141. The preamble to article I, section 28 also supports this position. It provides, in perti-
nent part: "[to accomplish these goals, broad reforms in the procedural treatment of accused
persons and the disposition and sentencing of convicted persons are necessary and proper as
deterrents to criminal behavior and to serious disruption of people's lives." CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 28.
142. In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 574, 709 P.2d at 1302-03, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
143. See infra notes 150-217 and accompanying text.
144. It should be pointed out, however, that there are precedents for abridging civil liber-
ties in this manner. Any one who goes to an airport today, for example, and walks up to a
security checkpoint, is generally deemed to be impliedly consenting to a search. See eg.,
United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773 (11th Cir. 1984). But see 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
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cogent arguments can be made on both sides, Justice Mosk perhaps best
sums up the difficulties facing schools today and the need to take control:
We live in troublesome, indeed hazardous, times. A decade or two
ago the potential delinquent pupil was merely truant, smoked ciga-
rettes, and drove hot rod cars. Today the delinquent of the same
age is often violent, and some use drugs and deadly weapons.
If we are not to have countless future generations of adult
criminals, we must make as certain as possible that we do not per-
mit criminality to begin with juveniles in public schools. We do
not have police officers in our classrooms. We do not have parents
in our classrooms. Therefore we must give to teachers and princi-
pals all the tools they reasonably need to preserve order in class-
rooms and school grounds.145
By applying article I, section 28(c) to facilitate the discovery and use
of potentially incriminating evidence, the courts would not only be fol-
lowing precedents established by four recent California cases, 14 6 but
would be continuing in the direction mapped out by three recent United
States Supreme Court cases.147 People contemplating criminal conduct
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.6, at 359 (1978 & 1986 Supp.)
(criticizing this approach as "basically unsound"). Travelers crossing borders, or their func-
tional equivalent, know that they may be searched without probable cause. See Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Americans are also showing an increasing willingness to
support sobriety checkpoints on urban streets in order to counter the menace of drunk drivers.
See Miller, Sobriety Checkpoints Likely to Be Upheld, One Way orAnother, L.A. Daily Journal,
Nov. 27, 1986, at 4 col. 3 (discussing Ingersoll v. Palmer, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1986) (official
opinion ordered depublished), and related cases). People accept these random and often intru-
sive searches because of the recognized dangers that such measures are designed to prevent.
Arguably, in approving the Safe Schools Provision, California voters have recognized a danger
on public school campuses which would require a similar loosening of search and seizure
standards.
145. In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d 550, 574, 709 P.2d 1287, 1302-03, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118,
133-34 (1985) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
146. Id.; Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982);
Halliman v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 163 Cal. App. 3d 46, 209 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1984); Gordon v. Santa Ana Unified School Dist., 162 Cal. App. 3d 530, 208 Cal. Rptr. 657
(1984).
147. Courts following this third interpretation of subdivision (c) could facilitate prosecu-
tion of suspects in a number of ways. One approach would simply involve a loose interpreta-
tion of the reasonable suspicion standard outlined in T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985), and In
re William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 562, 709 P.2d at 1294, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 125. See supra notes 42-
45 and accompanying text. What might be unreasonable suspicion in a generalized context
could be held reasonable in a school setting.
Under a second approach, California could build on the decision of United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984), and establish a new good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. This
exception might allow evidence obtained by school officials in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment to be admissible at trial if the officials acted with a good faith belief in the legality of their
actions.
Under a third approach, this state could follow the lead of the United States Supreme
Court in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), and extend the public safety exception to
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on school grounds would know that, statistically, they were more likely
to be convicted, and might think twice before acting.141 Students might
not bring drugs or weapons to school once they found out how much
easier it was to be caught. This potential deterrent effect would be con-
sistent with the purpose of article I, section 28(c) as articulated by the
authors of the proposition and the trial court in Hosemann. 149
D. Additional Duties/Remedies Under Existing Tort Law
A fourth interpretation is that article I, section 28(c) provides for
additional duties and/or remedies under existing tort doctrines when
someone is injured in a school setting. Under this view, the courts would
not actually create a new affirmative duty, but would build upon the
highly-developed body of law that has already been established.150 Three
concepts are particularly relevant in this regard: the special relationship
doctrine, the professional standard of care, and the availability of injunc-
tive relief.
1. Expanded Liability Under the Special Relationship Doctrine
The law has long recognized that some relationships may give rise to
a higher duty of care under an exception to the general rule that a person
is not liable for nonfeasance.151 If the courts determine that "a special
relation" exists between an actor and another party or an actor and a
the Miranda rule. In Quarles, the police interrogated a defendant without giving the Miranda
warnings because they suspected the existence of weapons nearby. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, declared that "this case presents a situation where concern for public safety
must be paramount to adherence to the literal langauge of... Miranda." Id. at 653. Since the
California voters have approved an initiative which "extends public safety" to the schools
(CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a)-apparently showing the same concern for public safety as Justice
Rehnquist), the courts could be justified in holding that the public safety exception applies to
all custodial interrogations, in a school setting, concerning evidence which might endanger the
safety of students and staff.
148. The recent decision in United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
arguably reflects a trend, with the courts becoming more supportive of harsher punishment for
crimes committed in a school context. Holland upheld the constitutionality of a 1984 law
permitting tougher punishment for selling illegal drugs near a school.
149. See supra note 5.
150. See supra notes 21-46 and accompanying text.
151. Very early on, our "highly individualistic" common law recognized a difference be-
tween "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance." As Prosser explains, "The reason for the distinction
may be said to lie in the fact that by 'misfeasance' the defendant has created a new risk of harm
to the plaintiff, while by 'nonfeasance' he has at least made his situation no worse." See W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984).
Although exceptions were later recognized for those "engaged in public callings," and to
a "limited group of relations, in which custom, public sentiment and views of social policy
have led the courts to find a duty of affirmative action," a person, in general, is still not liable
for failure to act. See id; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
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third person, the actor may be liable for failure to control the third per-
son. i5 2 Increasingly, the relationship of a school district to its students
has been deemed "special."' 53
In the recent case of Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dis-
trict,154 the court analyzed the extent of a school's duty of care under the
special relationship doctrine. Samuel Rodriguez, a high school student
who had been stabbed on the Inglewood High campus by an unknown,
non-student assailant, filed a complaint for personal injuries against the
district. He argued that the district negligently failed to provide "ade-
quate security and protection" against acts of violence involving danger-
ous weapons," even though the school had "a long history" of such
acts.' 55 The court in Rodriguez I held that no special relationship ex-
isted. The Safe Schools Provision was not mentioned, and the court fo-
cused on the issues of foreseeability and public policy in finding no higher
duty. 156
After determining that its holdings in Peterson v. San Francisco
Community College District 57 and Lopez v. Southern California Rapid
Transit District 58 could have significant impact on the final disposition
of Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court retransferred Rodriguez to
the Court of Appeal under California Rule of Court 29.4119 with instruc-
152. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). Traditionally, the commonly
recognized special relationships included (1) common carrier and passengers, (2) innkeeper
and guests, and (3) possessor of land and members of the public who enter in response to
landowner's invitation. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 314A (1965).
In California, the special relationship doctrine has taken on added importance since the
decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1976) (extending the special relationship doctrine by holding that a psychotherapist, be-
cause of a special relationship with his patient, has a duty to warn a third party of anticipated
danger). See Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d
1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984); Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d
894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 and Com-
ment d.
153. See Peterson, 36 Cal. 3d at 806-07, 685 P.2d at 1196-97, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46;
Rodriguez II, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 715, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 827; see also Dailey v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 470 P.2d 360, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1970).
For another application of this doctrine, see Phyllis P. v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. App.
3d 1193, 228 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1986), where a California appellate court applied the special
relationship doctrine to hold the Claremont Unified School District liable in a suit for inten-
tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
154. Rodriguez I, 199 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Rodriguez II, 186 Cal. App. 3d 707, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 823 (1986).
155. 199 Cal. Rptr. at 526; 186 Cal. App. 3d at 711, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
156. Id. at 528, 529.
157. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d. 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984).
158. 40 Cal. 3d 780, 710 P.2d 907, 221 Cal Rptr. 840 (1985).
159. CAL. CIV. PRO. R. CODE § 29.4 (West 1982).
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tions to reconsider the decision. 160
Upon reconsideration, the court again ruled for the defendant
school district, but departed from its approach in Rodriguez I and found
that a special relationship did exist between the Inglewood School Dis-
trict and the injured student which was sufficient to give rise to a higher
duty of care. 6 A key feature in this new analysis by the Rodriguez II
court was a close examination of article I, section 28(c) for its possible
impact. 162
The facts in Lopez were central to this inquiry. Carmen Lopez and
four other individuals brought an action against the Southern California
Rapid Transit District (RTD) for injuries they had received after a "vio-
lent physical fight" broke out on an RTD bus.' 63 A "violent argument"
had ensued after a group of juveniles began harassing other passengers,
but the bus driver apparently made no attempt to intervene.164 Plaintiffs
alleged that they were injured "as a direct and proximate result of RTD's
negligence."' 65 The California Supreme Court, ruling for the plaintiffs,
found that certain "characteristics of public transportation," along with
the statutory obligation imposed by Civil Code section 2100,166 provided
a "more than ample basis for finding a special relationship between com-
mon carriers and their passengers."' 67 Similarly, the Rodriguez II court
argued, certain characteristics of public education, along with the obliga-
tions of article I, section 28(c) and other legislative enactments, 168 lead to
a special relationship between a school district and its students "so as to
impose an affirmative duty on the district to take all reasonable steps to
protect its students."'' 69
160. 186 Cal. App. 3d at 710, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 824: "We are instructed on retransfer to
reconsider our prior opinion in this case in the light of the expanded vistas of governmental
tort liability set forth in Peterson and Lopez."
For an overview of the relatively new concept of retransfer, see C. CLANCY, CALIFORNIA
CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE § 22.30 (CEB, 2d ed. 1985).
161. 186 Cal. App. 3d at 710, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
162. See id. at 714-16, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 826-28.
163. 40 Cal. 3d at 784, 710 P.2d at 908, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. "A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe
carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a
reasonable degree of skill." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (West 1982).
167. 40 Cal. 3d at 789, 710 P.2d at 912, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
168. 186 Cal. App. 3d at 714-15, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27. The court refers to section 627
of the California Penal Code and section 32361 of the California Education Code. For a de-
tailed description of these and other recent enactments, see supra note 108.
169. 186 Cal. App. 3d at 715, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
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Although the decision in Rodriguez II ultimately turned on the issue
of government tort liability under California Government Code Section
815.6,7 ° an injured plaintiff could conceivably rely upon the Rodriguez
I1I language to show that under article I, section 28(c), a school district
now has a higher duty of care in all cases. 171 This interpretation would
be improper, however, not only because the analogy to Lopez is incorrect,
but because recent holdings under the special relationship doctrine all
reflect a case-by-case analysis of pertinent factors.
The reasoning in Rodriguez I1 is inappropriate to the extent that it is
based on an analogy to Lopez. 172 The Rodriguez II court, like the trial
court in Hosemann,173 compared a student's situation in the public
schools to a passenger's environment on a public bus."14 Yet the situa-
tion in Lopez is not at all analogous to a school setting. Rarely are stu-
dents forced into situations that are similar to rush hour on RTD buses.
School grounds have much more open space, and students have a signfi-
cant amount of freedom to move around. In addition, the decision in
Lopez was based on the special relationship between common carriers
and passengers. By contrast, courts generally do not treat schools the
same as common carriers under the special relationship doctrine.175
The most recent California Supreme Court decision on the applica-
tion of the special relationship doctrine in a school setting is Peterson v.
San Francisco Community College District. 176 Katheen Peterson, a stu-
dent at City College of San Francisco, was assaulted by an unidentified
male while she was ascending a stairway in the school's parking lot. The
assailant, who attempted to rape Ms. Peterson, had jumped out from
what the plaintiff claimed were "unreasonably thick and untrimmed foli-
age and trees" adjoining the stairway. The assailant used a modus oper-
andi which was similar to that used in previous attacks on the same
stairway, attacks that the defendants had been aware of and had taken
170. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980).
171. Once this duty is established, the plainitff could argue the statutory liability issue,
which the court in Rodriguez II indicated was still an open question-since article I, section
28(c) was held not to apply retroactively. See Rodriguez II, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 722, 230 Cal.
Rptr. at 832. See afso supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
172. The pertinent language in Lopez discussing bus passengers but arguably describing
public school students, reads as follows: "Large numbers ... are forced into very close physi-
cal contact with one another under conditions that often are crowded, noisy, and overheated.
At the same time, the means of entering and exiting the bus are.., under the exclusive control
of the bus driver." 40 Cal. 3d at 789, 710 P.2d at 912, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
173. Hosemann, supra note 5.
174. Id. at 27 ("Students and staff deserve no less a degree of care from the school
districts.").
175. See infra notes 176-180 and accompanying text.
176. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984).
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steps to prevent. 177
A notable difference between Peterson and Lopez is the description
of the relevant duties. While the court in Lopez held that Civil Code
section 2100 imposes upon common carriers "a duty of utmost care and
diligence," the Peterson court reiterated that California law imposes upon
school districts an apparently much less demanding duty: to supervise,
conduct, and enforce rules and regulations. 178 In addition, the Peterson
court looked to the special relationship between a possessor of land and
members of the public who enter in response to a landowner's invitation,
not the relationship between schools and pupils, in finding the college
liable for the assault. 179
Peterson leads to the conclusion that the court has found the school
district-pupil relationship to be a less potent vehicle for assigning liabil-
ity. If it is not as powerful as the "possessor of land-member of the pub-
lic" relationship, it is certainly not as powerful as the common carrier-
passenger relationship, which has traditionally given rise to the "highest"
duty of care under the special relationship doctrine.18 0
Even if the Lopez analogy in Rodriguez II is correct, the language
regarding higher duty would be applicable only to a similar fact pattern
where a district, aware that a particular high school has a "long history"
of similar violent assaults, fails to take measures to protect its students
from attacks by non-students on school grounds.
A duty to act does not automatically arise simply because a relation-
ship has been established. Liability is determined on a case-by-case basis
in all recent California Supreme Court cases involving the special rela-
tionship doctrine.1 81 The courts look at a series of "pertinent factors" in
each instance to determine whether the relationship is sufficient to give
rise to a duty of care.182 Among these factors are (1) foreseeability of
177. Id. at 805, 685 P.2d at 1195, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
178. See id. at 806 n.3, 685 P.2d at 1196 n.3, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 845 n.3 (quoting Dailey v.
Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 747,470 P.2d 360, 363, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379
(1970)).
179. Id. at 808-09, 685 P.2d at 1196-97, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47.
180. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 34, at 209 (5th ed. 1984) ("[A] substantial number of courts [instruct] the jury in terms of a
higher, or the highest, degree of care... in the case of the common carrier. They thus purport
to recognize a higher or lower basic standard of conduct for different defendants."); see also
Lopez, 40 Cal. 3d at 789, 710 P.2d at 912, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 845 ("Indeed, the special relation-
ship between a carrier and its passengers is even greater than that between other types of
businesses and their customers.").
181. See infra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
182. See Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 203, 649 P.2d 894, 897, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 252, 255 (1982) (where the pertinent factors are listed as guides to consider "in determin-
ing the existence of a duty of care in a given case") (emphasis added). See also Peterson, 36
[Vol. 14:789
SAFE SCHOOLS PROVISION
harm to the plaintiff, (2) extent of the burden to the defendant, (3) conse-
quences to the community of imposing liability, (4) extent of the agency's
powers (if a public agency is involved), and (5) limitations imposed upon
the agency by budget. 83
These factors, especially foreseeability and public policy,' 84 have
been emphasized by the California courts in recent decisions on liability
in a school setting based upon the special relationship doctrine. In Peter-
son, 18 5 the court stressed the importance of the foreseeability factor and
the clear indication that the duty to act in the particular fact situation
would not place an intolerable burden on the defendant. Recent appel-
late cases have relied upon the same pertinent factors in deciding
whether the special relationship between school district and pupil gave
rise to a higher duty of care.'8 6
The court in Rodriguez II187 appears to adopt this case-by-case ap-
proach in its own analysis, expressly stating that "[w]hether a relation-
ship is determined to be special for the purpose of imposing an
affirmative duty will depend on a variety of factors not yet fully defined
and, to no small extent, on important policy considerations."8 8 Thus the
Rodriguez II decision does not support the position that a special rela-
tionship between school district and student gives rise to a higher duty of
Cal. 3d at 806, 685 P.2d at 1196, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 845, which lists these same key "pertinent
factors" (originally outlined in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968)).
183. Peterson, 36 Cal. 3d at 806, 685 P.2d at 1196, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 845. Additional
"pertinent factors" for determining whether or not the relationship gives rise to a duty to act
include closeness of connection between defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and policy of preventing future harm. Id.
184. Pertinent factors relating to "public policy" include moral blame, policy of preventing
future harm, extent of burden, consequences to the community of imposing liability, the extent
of the agency's powers, and the limitations imposed by budget. See Peterson, 36 Cal. 3d at 806,
685 P.2d at 1196, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
185. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984).
186, See Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist., 177 Cal. App. 3d 792, 223 Cal. Rptr. 206
(1986); see also Rodriguez , 199 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984). The Lopez court, too, relied heavily on
several of these key pertinent factors. The court spent much time discussing preventive meas-
ures that might have been taken without imposing "a colossal financial burden on the district"
(thus dealing with several of the public policy factors). 40 Cal. 3d at 787-88, 710 P.2d at 910,
221 Cal. Rptr. at 844. Emphasis was placed on the fact that if trouble arises, the passengers
are "wholly dependent on the bus driver to summon help or provide a means of escape" (thus
examining the closeness of connection between defendant's conduct and the injury suffered).
Id. at 789, 710 P.2d at 912, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 845. Additionally, the liability itself is imposed
"only where... the carrier has or should have knowledge from which it may reasonably be
apprehended that an assault ... may occur" [thus stressing the importance of foreseeability].
Id. at 791, 710 P.2d at 914, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
187. 186 Cal. App. 3d 707, 230 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1986).
188. Id. (emphasis added).
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care in every case because of article I, section 28(c). The approach of the
California Supreme Court in Lopez, Peterson, 189 and Davidson 190 still
controls, and the key pertinent factors must be considered in light of each
particular fact situation.
2. A Higher Standard of Care in the School Setting
Another method for establishing a higher duty under existing tort
law would be to hold that article I, section 28(c) prescribes a higher stan-
dard of care for school officials. Currently, California law requires that
teachers and administrators exercise only the amount of care that "a per-
son of ordinary prudence, charged with [the officials' duties of supervi-
sion], would exercise under the same circumstances."' 91 Under this
interpretation of article I, section 28(c), though, school officials would be
held to the same higher standard of care as other "professional" persons.
The professional standard requires the exercise of care which is
"reasonable in light of ... superior learning and experience, and any
special skills, knowledge or training [that teachers and administrators]
may personally have over and above what is normally possessed by per-
sons in the field."' 92 Under this higher standard, California teachers and
administrators would likely become more assertive regarding school
safety.
This strategy for providing safer schools is flawed, however, because
the "profession" of which teachers and administrators are members is
education, not crime prevention or law enforcement. An analysis of the
professional standard's language indicates that it is not suited to the
problem of campus safety. The "superior learning and experience" of
educators is rooted in a mastery of subject matter and teaching method-
ology. Any "special skills, knowledge, or training," above and beyond
subject matter and methodology, would most likely be in educational
psychology, where an understanding of human behavior and interaction
can help facilitate success in the affective domain as well as in the cogni-
tive and psychomotor areas.193 Educators are entrusted with keeping or-
189. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984).
190. 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982).
191. Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 747, 470 P.2d 360, 363, 87
Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1970). See also Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School Dist., 40
Cal.2d 207, 210, 253 P.2d 1, 2 (1953); see generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320
(1965) (duty of one having custody of another).
192. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 185-89 (5th ed. 1984).
193. See generally M. KOURILSKY & L. QUARANTA, EFFECTIVE TEACHING: PRINCIPLES
& PRAcTic- (1987).
"Experiences in school and personal learning are not limited to the cognitive domain
[which involves intellectual processes]. In the affective domain are attitudes, feelings, emotions
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der on school grounds, and many have "special skills, knowledge and
training" in methods of behavior modification. Yet neither teachers nor
administrators are trained to be policemen. 194
In recent years, litigators have attempted to define a standard of
care for educators. The courts have not looked kindly on these so-called
"educational malpractice" cases, 195 for reasons which include "the ab-
sence of a workable rule of care against which defendant's conduct may
be measured."' 96 As Judge Jasen stated in Donohue v. Copiague Union
Free School District: 197
To entertain a cause of action for 'educational malpractice' would
require the courts not merely to make judgments as to the validity
of broad educational policies-a course we have unalteringly es-
chewed in the past-but, more importantly, to sit in review of the
day-to-day implementation of these policies.198
Although a standard of care in the educational malpractice context
is arguably different from a professional standard that would incorporate
supervisory skills necessary to keep schools safe, the same concerns are
likely to apply. The management skills of teachers and administrators are
often so intertwined with educational techniques in general that the
courts would need to make the same types of "judgments as to the valid-
ity of broad educational policies" that the Donohue court refused to
make. 199
and moral characteristics.... The third category... is the psychomotor domain, which refers
to bodily movements and bodily control." Id at 6, 7.
194. See eg. UCLA TEACHER EDUCATION MANUAL 1987-1988, UCLA Graduate School
of Education (copies of the manual may be obtained by writing to the UCLA Teacher Educa-
tion Laboratory, 220 Moore Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90024); see generally A Special Issue:
Teachers, Teaching and Teacher Education, 56 HARV. EDUC. REV. 4 (1986).
195. See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 826, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 862 (1976) ("the failure of educational achievement may not be characterized
as an 'injury' within the meaning of tort law").
Recent California cases continue to follow Peter W. and find against the party alleging
educational malpractice. See Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist., 177 Cal. App. 3d 792, 805,
223 Cal. Rptr. 206, 213-14 (1986) (alleged failure to teach safety rules); Keech v. Berkeley
Unifed School Dist., 162 Cal. App. 3d 464, 470, 210 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10 (1984) (alleged duty to
provide special education).
196. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 485, 439 A.2d 582, 584 (1982) (emphasis
added).
197. 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
198. Id. at 444-45, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (emphasis added). See also K.
ALEXANDER & M. ALEXANDER, supra note 25, at 481-82.
199. 47 N.Y.2d at 445, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378. It should be noted that
prescribing a standard of care which makes it easier to hold teachers liable for "educational
malpractice" and/or "failure to prevent crime" could very well result in even less college grad-
uates enrolling in teacher credential programs at a time when there is already a dangerous
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Thus, there are several good reasons behind the courts' inability to
develop a "workable" professional standard of care for educators. The
alleged mandate of article I, section 28(c) does not provide the means for
overcoming precedent in this regard.
3. Injunctive Relief as an Additional Remedy
Under another interpretation, article I, section 28(c) would allow
students and school personnel to use either a mandatory or prohibitory
injunction to enforce their right to safe schools. Currently, injunctive
relief is very difficult to obtain in the area of torts relating to school cam-
puses. Threatened assault and battery, for example, which comes up
often in a school setting, is generally not enjoined."c Trespass may be
enjoined to protect against outside intruders, but a recurring harm
and/or the prospect of irreparable injury must be shown before the rem-
edy is granted.2° ' Personal injury in general is rarely enjoined because a
high probability of recurrence must be shown for the legal remedy to be
held inadequate.2"2
If violations of the constitutional right to safe schools are alleged,
however, the courts would be more likely to grant an injunction. As
Professor Dobbs notes, "relief by way of injunction can now be obtained
for the protection of personal rights, so long as there is a need for such
protection and no reason of policy prevents it."2 3 By obtaining tempo-
rary restraining orders and then preliminary injunctions, potential vic-
tims could act quickly to prevent threatened assaults and batteries and
any anticipated negligence.
Although it can be argued that the voters approved article I, section
28(c) because they recognized a need for the protection afforded by an
injunction, the application of this form of remedy in a school setting
raises key policy concerns. First, the feasibility of an injunction designed
shortage of qualified applicants. The teaching profession will become an even less attractive
alternative if educators become more vulnerable to lawsuits.
For an overview of the recruitment problem, see A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the
Twenty-first Century, The Report of the Task Force on Teaching as a Profession, May 1986, at
26-32 (commonly known as "The Carnegie Report"). See also infra notes 253-270 and accom-
panying text.
200. There are two reasons why the courts will not usually enjoin threatened assault and
battery: (1) Equity will not generally enjoin the commission of a crime, and (2) such injunc-
tions are usually regarded as not very effective. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF REMEDIES 115-20 (injunctions against crimes), 536-38 (threatened assault and bat-
tery) (1973).
201. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526(2), (6) (West 1979).
202. Id.
203. D. DOBBS, supra note 200, at 113 (emphasis added).
to prevent acts such as threatened assaults or batteries is questionable.
Dobbs indicates that the courts have refrained from granting injunctive
relief in this context simply because the practical effect is so minimal.2"
An order prohibiting one student from coming in contact with another,
for example, would be very difficult to enforce. An order could require
that the student be suspended or even expelled, but the resulting interfer-
ence with the day-to-day policies of the school goes far beyond what the
courts have been willing to do in the past.20 5
Second, injunctions could place an unreasonable burden on the
schools. Aggressive plaintiffs might not only seek to expel innocent stu-
dents but to secure injunctions which would require schools to imple-
ment security measures of dubious value, such as metal detectors at
school entrances and/or an increased number of armed guards. Energies
and additional funds could be diverted from educational programs, pos-
sibly resulting in schools that are even less conducive to learning than
they are now.20 6
Third, the availability of injunctive relief might increase the
caseload in an already overburdened court system. This interpretation
could open the door to unreasonable requests for temporary restraining
orders that might only clog the courts and force teachers, school admin-
istrators, and district personnel to spend valuable time fighting legal
battles.
The interpretation that article I, section 28(c) provides for expanded
duties and/or additional remedies under current tort doctrines is an in-
appropriate application of the Safe Schools Provision. Not only does it
impose unrealistic obligations on the schools, but it is out of step with
both California case law and traditional tort principles.
E. Affirmative Duty to Make Schools Safe
The most liberal interpretation of the Safe Schools Provision is that
it creates a new, affirmative duty to make schools safe no matter what the
cost. This aggressive position has been adopted by the court in
204. Id. at 115.
205. See eg., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 445, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979). In Donohue, the court was not at all willing
"to sit in review of the day-to-day implementation of [school] policies." Id. See generally T.
Loscalzo, Liability for Malpractice in Education, 14 . oF L. & EDUC. 595, 606 (1985) (In
dicussing the public policy considerations which have precluded the courts from recognizing
educational malpractice as a cause of action, ..... cited as tantamount in importance is the
impact of... the disruption of the educational process .....
206. See infra notes 249-272 and accompanying text.
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Hosemann,20 7 and, if upheld, could have a substantial impact on the Cal-
ifornia public schools.
It appears that Stephen Hosemann has had no direct personal con-
tact with assailant Edward Hardy since the assault at Montera Junior
High. Yet he continued to fear further attacks by Hardy throughout his
years at Skyline High School.
Hosemann's fears might have been unjustified. Although he had ex-
perienced three negative incidents with Hardy (the theft of his wallet in
1981, a "confrontation" at the bus loading area in 1981-82, and the phys-
ical assault in 1983), these events had occurred years earlier on a differ-
ent campus. On the other hand, Hardy's record throughout these years
was decidedly uneven. Not only did he become involved in a fight with
two other Skyline students in late 1984 and reportedly make at least one
other unauthorized appearance on campus, but he has in fact been com-
mitted to Los Cerros Juvenile Camp on two separate occasions. In addi-
tion, Hardy knew that he was suspended from school in 1981 because
Hosemann reported the theft of the wallet, and he undoubtedly was
aware that Mrs. Hosemann, through a series of letters, phone calls, and
legal actions, had succeeded in keeping him out of the school he wanted
to attend.
Even if Hosemann's fears were justified, the Oakland School Dis-
trict's culpability in this regard is questionable. Hosemann did attend
the district's most prestigious high school, a top academic campus in an
affluent hilltop neighborhood, for three years, without incident. Judge
Bartalini, however, in a decision reflecting "the remarkable scope of a
declaratory relief action under California Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1060,"'2o8 applied the above facts and concluded that "[s]hould any
207. See supra note 5.
208. 5 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 243-45 (3d. ed. 1985). Although declaratory
relief is generally available only when an actual controversy exists, "an issue will usually be
deemed justiciable if a coercive cause of action has already accrued to one of the parties."
Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgements, 62 HARV. L. Rnv. 787, 794 (1949). Thus,
because Edward Hardy actually assaulted Hosemann on the Montera Junior High campus in
1983 (and a coercive cause of action apparently has already accrued), the case is an appropri-
ate one for declaratory relief, unlike People ex rel. George Deukmejian v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist., No. 64340 (Cal. App., 2d Dist., Jan. 25, 1983). In Deukmejian, the appellate
court held that a cause of action based on the rationale that "existing procedures have not
solved the problem of criminal activity on public school campuses" was not "the proper sub-
ject of declaratory relief." The subject of the case was deemed to be only "of broad general
interest," with "the absence of a true justiciable controversy." Id. at 10 (quoting in part Win-
ter v. Gnaizda, 90 Cal. App. 3d 750, 756, 152 Cal. Rptr. 700, 704 (1979)).
Arguably, however, the facts surrounding the Hosemann decision suggest the need for a
modification of the rules governing the scope of declaratory relief. The plaintiff had had no
personal contact with his former assailant since their junior high days. He was about to gradu-
school district fail to discharge its duty to make schools safe, or fail to use
reasonable diligence to discharge that duty, a student or staff member
may recover damages if he or she is injured as a legal result of the school
district's failure." 0 9
Although the parameters of this affirmative duty are still unclear,
the trial court stated that "a student or staff member need not resort to
the customary theory of negligence to recover compensatory damages for
a violation of his or her constitutional right to a safe school."' 10 The
court described the duty as an absolute obligation "to make schools safe"
and declared "that the intent of the voters was to create school campuses
free of crime and violence." '211 In another part of the opinion, however,
the court appeared to retreat from this "all-or-nothing" position when it
declared that the district's affirmative duty is only "to take reasonable
steps to protect its students and staff," and only "once the school district
has knowledge of crime and violence on the school campus. "212
What is clear, though, is that in Hosemann, (1) the court "imposed
an affirmative duty on school districts to implement plans designed to
alleviate crime and violence on school campuses,"213 (2) the judge deter-
mined that article I, section 28(c) affords a new cause of action for dam-
ages, and both school districts and private individuals may be held liable
for violations of this constitutional right," 4 and (3) the potential cost to
the schools is deemed irrelevant, since "denying a constitutional right on
ate from the district's best academic campus. The "actual controversy" stemmed only from an
apparently insignificant fight between two young boys, with no evidence of any type of injury
... the kind of minor skirmish that has occurred from time immemorial. The trial court,
however, after studying these events, ordered the Oakland School District "to make the
schools safe," no matter what the cost. Hoseman, supra note 5, at 28, 36.
209. Hosemann, supra note 5, at 36 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that the
judge's position in this case is virtually identical to that espoused by Ms. Sawyer in her 1983
Pacific Law Journal article. See Sawyer, supra note 17. In fact, the judge actually thanks her,
George Nicholson, and the Pacific Legal Foundation (whose attorneys filed an amicus curiae
brief) by name.
210. Hosemann, supra note 5, at 36.
211. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
212. Id. at 27.
213. Id. at 36. The judge has retained jurisdiction so that he can require the Oakland
School District to reappear and inform the court "of specific steps it has taken to satisfy the
mandate of Section 28(c)." Id. at 37.
It should be noted that the trial court decision in Hosemann has no precedential value
whatsoever. See generally H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
(1912).
214. Hosemann, supra note 5, at 37. Arguably, if this decision is upheld, article I, section
28(c) could (also) be applied to satisfy the statutory liability analysis under section 815.6 of the
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the grounds of inadequate resources cannot be justified." '215
The Hosemann decision is incorrect and should be overturned. Not
only does it ask the schools to do something that is manifestly impossi-
ble, but it is inconsistent with California case law2 16 and ignores impor-
tant public policy considerations. 21
7
1. The Duty to 'Make Schools Safe"
All of us want to walk on safe streets, live in safe cities, and raise our
children in a safe environment. In spite of all the progress we have made
throughout the centuries, however, the world today is arguably not any
safer than it was before. Much has been written about the great techno-
logical advances that have brought with them so many new dangers and
risks.'2 In addition, people continue to threaten each other and prey on
each other just as they did thousands of years ago. Weapons might be
different, but motives do not seem to have changed.
Safety continues to be a matter of degree. 219 Although people today
exhibit "widely diverse value judgments about threats to the quality of
public health, safety, and the environment, '220 most people realize that
"[s]ome kinds of risks are associated with all human activities, including
... education."22 Most realize that things can be made "safer", but that
life cannot ever be regulated to achieve "perfect safety. ' 222
Even if extreme, intrusive security measures are instituted in the
public schools, and, somehow, all drugs and weapons are kept out,223
neither drug abuse nor assault and battery would be prevented. Drugs
could still be exchanged and ingested off campus, and students could still
use their hands to fight. It is certainly possible to make schools safer,
California Government Code. See Rodriguez II, 186 Cal. App. 3d 707, 230 Cal. Rptr. 823
(1986).
See also Tirpak v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 232 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1986), for a clear
description of the three-prong test to ascertain whether or not liability might be imposed under
any "enactment" in a school setting.
215. Hosemann, supra note 5, at 28.
216. See infra notes 225-244 and accompanying text.
217. See infra notes 245-273 and accompanying text.
218. See generally M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982).
219. See generally REGULATORY REFORM (M. Maxey & R. Kuhn, eds. 1985).
220. Id. at 4.
221. Zebroski, The Uses ofRisk Assessment in Regulation and Self-Regulation, in REGULA-
TORY REFORM, supra note 218, at 131 (emphasis added); see also McGarity, Risk Assessment
and Public Trust: The Role of the University, in REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 219, at
125 ("If 'Joe Citizen' expects regulators to make the world risk-free, then he will inevitably be
disappointed.").
222. See REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 219, at 5.
223. Arguably, only highly extreme and totally unreasonable measures such as daily strip
searches at the school gates would keep all drugs and weapons off school grounds.
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but public schools will always be a reflection of our society. It is not
possible to make the schools safe for the same reasons that it is not possi-
ble to make the world safe.
2. California Case Precedent
a. Schools as "Insurers of Safety"
Courts have recognized that there are limits to what the school dis-
tricts are able to do to safeguard students.224 In fact, "school districts
and their employees have never been considered insurers of the physical
safety of their students." '225
The court of appeal in Rodriguez I226 found "no precedent to re-
quire the school district to be guarantors of protection from all harm. "227
Decisions throughout the country have followed this principle. 228 The
Hosemann coUrt'S229 use of the words "assure safe schools" and its de-
mand that schools be made safe no matter what the cost lead to the con-
clusion that this trial court has chosen to ignore a clearly established rule
of law.23°
b. The Broad, Sweeping Changes Urged by Proponents of Proposition 8
The California courts have been unwilling to interpret Proposition 8
so as to grant the broad, sweeping changes urged by its proponents.
Although the initiative was given a grand title-"The Victims' Bill of
Rights"-and was widely proclaimed to be a landmark in the fight
224. See ag., Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula School Dist., 83 Cal. App. 3d 492, 498, 500,
147 Cal. Rptr. 898, 901 (1978).
225. Id. at 498, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
226. 199 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
227. Id. at 528.
228. See e.g., Broward County School Bd. v. Ruiz, 493 So. 2d 474, 11 Fla. Law W. 1476
(Fla. App. 1986); Cavello v. Sherburne-Earlville Cent. School Dist., 110 A.D.2d 253, 494
N.Y.S.2d 466 (1985), Passafaro v. Board of Educ., 43 A.D.2d 918, 353 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1974).
229. Hosemann, supra note 5, at 27.
230. The trial court's declaration is very much akin to strict liability. Recent cases and
statutes show "a very marked tendency to extend strict liability into new fields." In this re-
gard, the Hosemann decision would be consistent with the modem trend. W. PROSSER, supra
note 25, at 582-83
However, the law is well-settled that a defendant "may be regarded as so engaged in the
rendition of such an essential public service as to justify an exception to strict liability. It is
generally held that the rules of strict liability do not apply if the activity is carried out in
pursuance of a public duty." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 25, § 79, at 567-68. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965).
Thus, if Hosemann is imposing strict liability, the schools, performing an essential public
service on an ongoing basis, arguably can challenge the decision on the ground that it ignores
the well-established public duty exception to the strict liability doctrine.
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against crime,2 31 the cases exhibit a clear trend toward sustaining "limit-
ing" interpretations of the various provisions.
Subdivision (d), for example ("Right to Truth-in-Evidence"), was
seen by some as the vehicle for completely removing the controversial
"exclusionary rules" from California law.2 32 Article I, section 28(d) pro-
vides that "all relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding.233  Yet In re Lance W.,2 a4 the 1985 California Supreme
Court case that upheld the application of subdivision (d) to admit rele-
vant evidence, included several caveats regarding the extent of its ruling.
The court held that article I, section 28(d) abrogated both California's
'vicarious exclusionary rule' and a defendant's right to object to the in-
troduction of evidence seized in violation of article I, section 13 (under
independent state grounds).2 35 The court cautioned, however, that it has
not addressed "the question of whether section 28(d) mandates admis-
sion of evidence obtained in violation of other constitutional provi-
sions. '236 In addition, it expressly stated that "whether or to what extent
Proposition 8 entails a broader sweep is not a question we need to decide
here. '2 37  Thus, although certain evidence that California courts had
once excluded will now be admissible, many of the so-called California
exclusionary rules still remain in effect.238
231. Co-author George Nicholson called Proposition 8 "the most effective anticrime pro-
gram ever proposed to help the forgotten victims of crime." Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d
236, 306 app., 651 P.2d 274, 320 app., 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 76 app. (1982) (rebuttal to argument
against Proposition 8).
232. The exclusion of evidence under California law is not based on one rule alone. There
are, in fact, a large variety of so-called "exclusionary rules," based on statutes, cases and the
California Constitution. In California, before Proposition 8, evidence could be excluded under
article I, section 13 (guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures), article I, section 1
(right to privacy), article I, section 15 (self-incrimination privilege), various statutory exclu-
sionary rules under the penal, government, and evidence codes, and certain judicially-created
rules. See generally J. CHRISTIANSEN, PROPOSITION 8: A THREE-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 12-
27 (CEB Program Booklet, Aug. 1985).
233. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 28(d).
234. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
235. Id. at 879, 694 P.2d at 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
236. Id. at 885 n.4, 694 P.2d at 751, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
237. Id. at 887 n.7, 694 P.2d at 753 n.7, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640 n.7.
238. Id. at 888, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640. In addition, it should be noted that
the federal exclusionary rule remains in force, and California courts must continue to exclude
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Id.
One so-called "exclusionary rule" in California is Evidence Code scction 940, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. In the recent case of People v. May, 43 Cal. 3d 344, 729 P.2d
778, 233 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1987), the California Supreme Court ruled that subdivision (d) could
not be applied to allow self-incriminating statements, obtained in violation of the Miranda
decision, to be used for impeachment purposes at trial. Justice Mosk, writing for the majority
in May, declared that the language of article I, section 28(d) created an exception for all evi-
Similar limits have been placed on the language of subdivision (f)
("Use of Prior Convictions"). In People v. Castro,239 the majority con-
cluded that the trial court in a post-Proposition 8 case retains discretion
to exclude prior convictions when their impeachment value is out-
weighed by their prejudicial effect.2" ° In People v. Valentine,2 1 the court
found that although the second sentence of section 28(f)242 eliminates
the judicially created rule denying the jury all knowledge that defendant
is an ex-felon,243 if defendant stipulates to ex-felon status, evidence of the
nature of his prior conviction may still be withheld.2'
In Hosemann, the trial court seeks to interpret section 28(c) as pro-
viding for the broad, sweeping changes that the proponents of Proposi-
tion 8 appear to desire. Yet subdivisions (d) and (f) of the same
proposition have already been given limiting interpretations. The
Hosemann decision represents a significant departure from the clear
trend that has emerged in cases construing the application of article I,
section 28.
3. Public Policy Considerations
Recent California cases dealing with injuries on school grounds have
stressed the importance of public policy considerations. In Peterson,245
for example, the court focused on the policy of preventing future harm,
the extent of burden on the defendant, the consequences to the commu-
nity of imposing liability, the extent of the agency's powers, and the limi-
dence covered by the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by providing that
"[n]othing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privi-
lege." Id.
But see Court's Rehearing Could Find Mosk Being Reversed, L.A. Daily Journal, July 3,
1987, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (describing the California Supreme Court's decision to rehear People v.
May, and the possibility of a different result now that three of the judges who voted for the
defendant have been removed from office).
239. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
240. Id. Since the majority had concluded that subdivision (d) applies California Evidence
Code section 352 to subdivision (f), the trial court was deemed to have continued discretion to
exclude priors, "even though the first sentence of section 28(f) states that priors shall be used
'without limitation' for impeachment. See People v. Valentine, 42 Cal. 3d 170, 177, 710 P.2d
913, 228 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1986).
For an excellent discussion of Castro and some creative suggestions regarding the inter-
pretation of the entire "Victims' Bill of Rights," see Note, Proposition 8 and the California
Supreme Court: Interpretation Run Riot, 60 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 540 (1987).
241. 42 Cal. 3d 170, 720 P.2d 913, 228 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1986).
242. Article I, section 28(f) of the California Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"When a prior felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it shall be proven to the
trier of fact in open court."
243. See People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980).
244. 42 Cal. 3d at 177, 720 P.2d at 916-17, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29.
245. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d. 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984).
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tations imposed by budget.246 The San Francisco Community College
District was ultimately held liable because the court felt that similar as-
saults could be prevented if the school, after being notified of previous
attempted crimes, simply trimmed the bushes and provided more light in
the parking area.247
In Rodriguez ,248 the public policy analysis was also a major ration-
ale behind the court's decision. "Policy considerations weigh against im-
posing duty," the court stated in a sub-heading,249 holding that a student
injured by a non-student on school grounds could not recover from the
school district for its failure to protect him. "Insuring such protection,"
the court reasoned, "would impose a substantial financial burden on the
school district, which operates on a limited budget. " 250
The trial court in Hosemann, however, declared that cost should not
be considered a factor, boldly proclaiming that "[d]enying a constitu-
tional right on the grounds of inadequate resources cannot be justi-
fied.' 251 This analysis ignores the financial burden such a ruling would
place upon already strapped school districts.25 2
The widely acclaimed Commons Report 253 emphasizes the fact that
we cannot afford to plan for changes in the public schools "regardless of
costs." Money is shown to be both a major consideration and a major
problem.254 In the 1983-84 school year, for example, California, once a
national trend-setter in providing quality education, spent $185 per pupil
less than the United States average. 255 Although that downward trend
246. See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
247. 36 Cal. 3d at 814, 685 P.2d at 1202, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51.
248. 199 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
249. Id. at 529.
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. Hosemann, supra note 5, at 28.
252. Professor Edwin L. Zebroski provides a historical perspective for this issue. "One of
the dubious luxuries left over from the age of affluence," he writes, "is the concept that a risk-
free society or a zero-risk ideal for some activities is a desirable and attainable social good,
regardless of cost." Zebroski, The Uses of Risk Assessment in Regulation and Self-Regulation,
in REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 220, at 134.
253. Who Will Teach Our Children? A Strategy for Improving Caifornia's Schools, The
Report of the California Commission on the Teaching Profession, (Nov. 1985) [hereinafter The
Commons Commission Report].
The Commons Commission was sponsored by the California Superintendent of Public
Instruction and the Education Committees of both the State Senate and the State Assembly. It
was chaired by Dorman L. Commons, a business consultant, and was composed of a "blue-
ribbon panel" of educators, attorneys, and corporate consultants.
254. See infra notes 255-270 and accompanying text.
255. See The Commons Commission Report, supra note 253, at 44.
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was reversed by the passage of Senate Bill 813256 in 1983, the commission
reports that "more funding will be needed" because of projected in-
creases in enrollment alone, not only "to keep pace in the future," but
"to support critically needed improvements. 257
Current projections for the 1987-88 school year indicate that the
state education budget, "after four years of increase," is on "a backward
slide."' 258 According to the director of PACE (Policy Analysis for Cali-
fornia Education, a consortium of UC Berkeley, Stanford, and the Uni-
versity of Southern California), the total amount of money earmarked for
education, even figuring in estimated lottery funds, falls short of the min-
imum total needed "lust to keep the education system fiscally even." 259
The Commons Commission found that California ranked fiftieth in
the nation in student-teacher ratio, 26 ° that fully one-fourth of the Califor-
nia teachers surveyed did not have a textbook for every student,261 and
that, because of deferred maintenance, "many classrooms in California
256. Senate Bill 813, The Hughes-Hart Educational Reform Act of 1983, contained eighty-
one provisions which are now included in various sections of the California Education Code.
Forty-three of these provisions were mandated, while the other thirty-eight were permissive.
Key changes included funding for increased instructional time (CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 42238.7,
42238.8 (West Supp. 1987)), the establishment of the California Mentor Teacher Program
(CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44490-44496 (West Supp. 1987)), increased requirements for minimum
teacher salaries (CAL. EDUC. CODE § 45023.4 (West Supp. 1987)), and stiffer graduation re-
quirements (CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 51225-51225.3 (West Supp. 1987)).
257. The Commons Commission Report, supra note 253, at 44 ("Because of increased en-
rollments, expenditures for K-12 education must rise by about 59 percent by 1990 just to
maintain the same level of real spending per student. Revenues for K-12 are projected to grow
between 50 and 72 percent over this period. Unless new revenues are developed, there will not
be enough funds to significantly improve education, and possibly not even enough to maintain
the same level").
258. Odden, Education Is Back on Short Rations, L.A. Times, Jan. 27, 1987, § 2, at 5, col.
3. After much heated debate, "[Governor] Deukmejian vetoed about $170 million in school
funds from the budget sent to him by the ... Legislature," thus providing only "$330 million
in new money for schools." L.A. Times, July 26, 1987, § I, at 38, col. 4.
259. According to Professor Odden, "the minimum total [increase] needed just to keep the
... system fiscally even without significant teacher salary increases" was $654 million, and $1
billion if teacher salaries were to rise. Odden, supra note 257, Jan. 27, 1987, § 2, at 5, ol. 5.
Yet the actual funding increase is apparently only $611 million (a figure obtained by adding
the state's $330 million increase to Odden's estimated increase of $281 million in local prop-
erty tax revenue, id., and not including any possible increase in lottery funds). See also The
Sinking Schools, L.A. Times, July 27, 1987, § 2, at 4, col. 1 (pointing out that even with the
fund increases of the mid-1980's, "the state has fallen ... [back] ... to 33rd in terms of
spending per pupil, now about one-third the level of New York").
But see Brimelow, Are We Spending Too Much on Education?, FORBES, Dec. 29, 1986, at
72 (an indictment of the bureaucratic waste that arguably exists in the United States public
schools and prevents Americans from getting a proper "return for their money").
260. The Commons Commission Report, supra note 253, at 26-27.
261. Id. at 28 ("The cost of an average science textbook today is $17 each, yet the entire
appropriation for materials per student per year in secondary schools is only $12.").
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will become totally unusable in the near future unless corrective meas-
ures are taken. '262 These problems must all be considered in light of
predictions that "following a decade of falling enrollments, the public
schools will grow by nearly 450,000 students. 263
The most significant problem, however, according to the commis-
sion, is "Who Will Teach Our Children?" Good teachers can have a
positive effect even with large classes, a shortage of instructional materi-
als, and poor building facilities. Without good teachers, though, im-
provements in these other areas will have little, if any, effect on the
quality of our educational program. 2 "
Not only does California face a teacher shortage "whose true magni-
tude is not yet known, ' 265 but the teaching profession itself "is beset with
problems. '2 66 The commission stresses the importance of restructuring
the career of teaching to attract top quality credential candidates and to
keep our best people in the profession.267 A key recommendation is the
adoption of a salary schedule that would make beginning teacher salaries
competitive with other professions as well as restore lost purchasing
power for career teachers. Over the past decade, the commission reports,
"teachers' purchasing power has declined 15 percent. Not surprisingly,
the recent Metropolitan Life Teacher Poll of teachers nationwide re-
vealed that 'more than a quarter-mostly veteran teachers-reported
they would leave teaching in the next five years. Dissatisfaction with
wages was the primary reason given.' ",261
262. Id. at 27 ("The state Department of Education has an inventory of the school system's
maintenance backlog that calls for $2 billion in maintenance and repair. Each year, California
schools need an additional $350 million statewide to keep existing facilities in good repair.").
263. Id. at 9. The Commons Commission has recommended the institution of "the quarter
system for year-round use of the schools" both to conserve funds and to use existing facilities
more efficiently. Id. at 27.
264. Although it is certainly true that a good teacher can "teach" a group of any reason-
able size, under a tree, without any instructional materials, it must be emphasized that very
few people will be able to do this for very long. See id. at 11, where the commission lists ten
key reasons for low morale and a continuing exodus of top quality people from the teaching
profession. Teachers today are faced with increased pressure to conduct quality educational
programs, yet they are being asked to do this with fewer resources in an environment that is
often even less conducive to learning than it has been in the recent past.
265. Id. at 37.
266. Id. at 11.
267. Id. at 11-12. The commission arrived at 27 recommendations in response to the ques-
tion: "What will it take to attract, train, and retain enough good people in teaching?"
268. Id. at 39-40 (emphasis added). "In 1982-83, for example, California teachers had a
median income of $24,375, compared with a national median for all college-educated workers
of $41,000. Even adjusting for the difference between nine and twelve month salaries, Califor-
nia teachers make an average of $10,000 less than their college classmates." Id. at 38.
The commission notes that although "California ranks seventh among states in average
teacher salaries, when teachers' salaries are considered as a percentage of each state's total
It is apparent from these facts that public policy considerations pre-
clude the courts from requiring the schools to do anything "regardless of
costs." Not only is funding for public education difficult to obtain now,
but more money will be needed if we wish to improve our schools in the
future. Although many of the Commons Commission's recommenda-
tions can be implemented without additional funds,2 69 the report states
very bluntly that "improving California's schools will not be cheap."270
A legal system that refuses to take our schools' financial status into
consideration is at best frivolous and at worst totally irresponsible. For-
tunately, California courts have not ignored this ongoing problem. The
appellate court in Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula School District,271 for
example, responding to the plaintiff's suggestion that schools be required
to institute "virtual round-the-clock supervision," declared that
This would impose a financial burden which manifestly would im-
pinge on the very educational purpose for which the school ex-
ists.... [A]t some point the obligation of the public entity to
answer for the malfeasance or misfeasance of others, whether chil-
dren or parents, reaches its outer limits. Public entities labor
under budgetary constraints which peculiarly affect their obliga-
tion of care.272
Those who seek to make our schools safer cannot ignore the realities
outlined in the Commons Commission Report. In fact, by acting to im-
plement the recommendations of the commission, policy makers would
be doing more to fight crime and drug abuse than any court could do by
imposing additional legal obligations on school districts. 273
At what point is there too much law? Current doctrines, statutes,
and case law-properly enforced-already provide both the schools and
the victims of crime with a wide array of rights and remedies. The inter-
pretation of the Safe Schools Provision by the trial court in Hosemann 274
personal income, California is tied with Florida for the lowestpay in the nation." Id. (emphasis
added).
269. Id. at 43.
270. Id.
271. 83 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1978).
272. Id. at 500, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 902 (citing Wright v. Arcadia School Dist., 230 Cal. App.
2d 272, 278-80, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1964).
273. Students who are better educated, more healthy mentally and physically, and
equipped with a greater understanding of life itself are less likely to participate in violent,
counterproductive acts.
See generally T. Sizer, Horace's Compromise: The Dilemma of the American High School
(1985) (the first report from A Study of High Schools, co-sponsored by the National Associa-
tion of Secondary School Principals and the Commission on Educational Issues of the Na-
tional Association of Independent Schools).
274. See supra notes 208-217 and accompanying text.
Summer 19871 SAFE SCHOOLS PROVISION
834 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 14:789
will require more government involvement and more "intrusion" on the
part of the courts at a time when we need less intrusion, fewer court
orders, and a policy that would put a halt to the ever-growing number of
legal disputes in our society.
School administrators need a less technical system. They are al-
ready faced with voluminous codes plus the most technical criminal pro-
cedure system in the world. They do not need yet another legal
obligation with parameters and guidelines that may take many years and
an endless number of court cases to unravel.
The courts of appeal and the supreme court should reject the
Hosemann court's interpretation of article I, section 28(c). Imposing an
affirmative duty to make schools safe regardless of cost would violate
public policy, ignore clearly-established precedent, and, if interpreted lit-
erally, would require the schools to do something that is manifestly im-
possible. Such an additional legal obligation would only cause more
problems... while solving none.
III. The Impact of Additional Duties and Increased Liability
Additional financial problems and more confusion regarding legal
obligations are not the only likely consequences of an interpretation that
provides for additional duties and increased school liability under article
I, section 28(c). An affirmative duty under the Safe Schools Provision
could give children the constitutional right to refuse to attend school.275
As the defendants argued in People ex rel. George Deukmejian v. Los
Angeles Unified School District :276
If students and teachers of the [Los Angeles Unified School Dis-
trict] are, in fact, deprived of constitutional rights by being re-
quired to attend and remain in schools which are unsafe, then they
are entitled to immediate relief and not the convoluted and attenu-
ated relief sought by the petitioners. The only possible way to pro-
vide such immediate relief is to declare the invalidity of the
Compulsory Education Law.27 7
The fear of liability, too, could cause an increase in the rate of expul-
sion, as schools seek to remove "problem" students who might injure
275. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 306 app., 651 P.2d 274, 320 app., 186 Cal. Rptr.
30, 76 app. (1982). Stanley M. Roden (District Attorney of Santa Barbara County), Richard
L. Gilbert (District Attorney of Yolo County), and Terry Goggin (Chair of the State Assembly
Committee on Criminal Justice) joined to write this and other arguments against Proposition
8, for the California Ballot Pamphlet (Primary Election, June 1982).
276. No. 64340 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist., Jan. 25, 1983).
277. No. C323360, at 11 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 1983) (Answer of Los Angeles County
Respondents to Petition for Hearing).
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others. Not only would this raise questions of due process 278 but it may
result in a conflict with California's fundamental right to an education.279
Retaining jurisdiction of the schools "to assure (that) the defendant
... demonstrates... compliance, '2  as the courts did in the desegrega-
tion cases, may also result in more problems than it solves.28' Such judi-
cial tampering with the public schools has not been successful.
Desegregation orders over the past thirty years have caused significant
domestic turmoil, and often have resulted in public school systems that
are even less effective in providing quality education than they once had
been.282
Another possible consequence of increased liability is the implemen-
tation of additional security measures. The Hosemann court, in fact,
points toward this alternative, when it says that "this new, inalienable,
Constitutional right appears to impose an aTirmative duty.., to provide
improved school security."2 Yet other California courts have already
recognized some of the problems inherent in this approach. The court in
Rodriguez I, for example, declared that "[t]he effectiveness of a security
force is questionable, unless exceedingly large, and even then, the ability
278. For example, can "preventive" expulsion be constitutional?
279. Serrano L, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
280. Hosemann, supra note 5, at 37. After granting declaratory relief
[to assure the defendant school district demonstrates some compliance with Article
I, Section 28(c), this court retains such jurisdiction as may be necessary, and defend-
ant school district is ordered to appear before this ourt ... and... inform this court
of the specific steps it has taken to satisfy the mandate of Section 28(c).
Id.
281. The desegregation analogy is stressed by proponents of a liberal interpretation of sec-
tion 28(c). Sawyer, supra note 17, at 1330-31. Author Kimberly Sawyer claims, in fact, that
"the strongest support for imposing a duty on school districts to make their schools safe is
found in school desegregation cases." Id. at 1330 (emphasis added). The author argues that
"[i]f the courts may order a school district to take steps to alleviate segregation in the school
system, the courts should also order the school district to take steps to alleviate crime and
violence on school campuses." Id at 1330-31. The analogy is also emphasized in aLosAnge-
les Times article on the Hosemann decision. Judge Orders Oakland Schools to Find Way to
Expel Campus Crime, L.A. Times, May 13, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 4. ("Bartalini suggested that
courts may assume jurisdiction over the Oakland schools to ensure that they maintain security,
much as judges adopt jurisdiction over schools to ensure compliance with desegregation orders."
(emphasis added)).
282. See, eg., J. LuKAs, COMMON GROUND (1985) (describing the multitude of problems
faced by the Boston schools after desegregation was ordered); see also Public Schools in
Pasadena Achieve Gains as Strife Ends, L.A. Times, June 8, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 5 (describing
the negative impact of the desegregation order and the positive direction the school system has
been able to take since the federal court order was lifted in 1980).
283. Hosemann, supra note 5, at 31 (quoting Sawyer, supra note 17).
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to guard against non-student criminal behavior is dubious. 284
If the schools install metal detectors at gates and building en-
trances,2" 5 fill the halls with a massive, armed security presence, and/or
institute random searches of students who are "reasonably suspected" of
carrying weapons and drugs, 28 6 the result will undoubtedly be an atmos-
phere of acute paranoia, and an environment even less conducive to
learning than now. Schools will be filled with tension and distrust. Com-
plaints about "Big Brother ' 287 and the violation of students' fourth
amendment rights will cause additional controversy and, undoubtedly,
more litigation. Increased force might also have a boomerang effect: in-
stead of suppressing crime, it might trigger even more violence and even
more drug use among angry and rebellious students.288
Administrators might decide to introduce security measures only at
certain schools, since, arguably, all schools do not need them. However,
this decision could raise additional problems. If only some schools get
stricter measures, complaints about unequal treatment could follow, both
from schools that claim they need greater security and schools that claim
they need less.289
Finally, all the controversy, publicity, and paranoia regarding
"safety" could very well result in a new exodus of students from the
public schools. 290 In California today, this would only serve to widen the
gulf between "the haves" and "the have-nots." Less contact between dif-
ferent segments of our society would mean less understanding and even
less willingness to work together than we see now in the late 1980's.
284. 199 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (1984). See also Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula School
Dist., 83 Cal. App. 3d 492, 500, 147 Cal. Rptr. 898, 902 (1978) (arguing against "virtual
round-the-clock supervision or prison-tight security" (emphasis added)).
285. The installation of metal detectors was recommended by George Nicholson, co-author
of Proposition 8, in a Los Angeles Times article on the Hosemann decision: "the solution may
involve such tactics as the use of metal detectors outside school buildings. . . ." L.A. Times,
May 13, 1986, § 1, at 3 col. 4.
286. It should be noted that a logical extension (reductio ad absurdum) of the increased
security approach would involve the searching of teachers and administrators. Airline em-
ployees, in fact, must now submit to searches at airports.
287. See G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
288. Innumerable sources are available to document the causes and effects of anger and
rebellion among young people in the recent past. See, e.g., J. SINCLAIR, GUITAR ARMY:
STREET WRraNGS/PRIsON WRITINGS (1972); T. WOLFE, THE ELECTRIC KOOL-AID ACID
TEsT (1968).
289. One wonders what criteria a school district could use to determine which schools get
increased security, and which schools do not. It is easy to envision anger among large seg-
ments of the community, and possible charges of racism.
290. See supra note 280.
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Conclusion
Courts are now faced with the task of interpreting article I, section
28(c) of the California Constitution. A tireless group of Proposition 8
proponents and "school safety advocates" is leading the push in both the
media and the courts for a determination that the Safe Schools Provision
prescribes additional duties and increased liability. Politically, it appears
difficult to disagree with this aggressive posture. After all, who is willing
to go on record against safe schools?
A detailed analysis, however, of both the legal and practical implica-
tions of such an affirnative duty, leads to a different conclusion. An
examination of relevant doctrines, statutes, and cases reveals two distinct
theories of increased liability: additional duties/remedies under existing
tort law (the position argued by the plaintiff in Rodriguez I1), and an
affirmative duty to make schools safe (the position taken by the trial
court in Hosemann). The first position is out of step with both California
case law and traditional tort principles. The second position not only
ignores clearly established precedent, but is plainly violative of public
policy. Both interpretations impose obligations on the schools that are at
best unrealistic and at worst manifestly impossible.
On a practical level, the imposition of additional duties and in-
creased liability is fraught with hidden dangers. Students and adminis-
trators, acting under the real or perceived pressures of this new mandate,
could create conflicts with other state and federal constitutional provi-
sions that would take years to unravel. The possible addition of increased
security measures could easily result in anger, tension, the "boomerang
effect" of more violence and drug use, and a school atmosphere that is
even less conducive to learning than now.
This Article has demonstrated that there are, in fact, three reason-
able alternatives for the courts to adopt in interpreting the Safe Schools
Provision. Under one interpretation, the courts would hold that the Safe
Schools Provision is nothing more than a restatement of existing law,
from which no additional rights can be derived. Under a second inter-
pretation, the courts would find that article I, section 28(c) is not self-
executing, and that the legislature must define the specific acts that
would be prohibited and/or the specific acts that would be required.
Under a third interpretation, the courts would rule that the Safe Schools
Provision, as part of the Victims' Bill of Rights, simply makes it easier to
prosecute those who commit crimes on school grounds by allowing fewer
procedural rights and safeguards to suspects in a school setting.
From both a legal and a practical perspective, then, it is possible to
disagree with those who would impose additional duties and increased
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liability on the schools. It is possible to take this position both intellectu-
ally and politically and not be considered "against safe schools." There
are better ways to make the California schools more safe, secure, and
peaceful than to hold that a nebulous constitutional provision can or
should be a vehicle for change. The public schools in California are
shaped by complicated forces that are, ultimately, only a reflection of
society as a whole. Although simple solutions might be attractive at first
glance, a detailed analysis reveals that a long-range plan for improving
our entire educational system will undoubtedly be more effective in creat-
ing a school environment where both students and teachers can be hap-
pier and more productive.
